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INTRODUCTION
Recent affirmative action litigation involving the University of
Texas,' the University of Washington,
2 and the University of Michigan
3
has once again ushered the diversity rationale for affirmative action onto
center stage. This Article focuses on a different aspect of diversity that en-
tails culture-conscious decision-making that seeks to exploit meritorious
cultural insights, experiences, and facilities offered by persons of tradition-
ally-excluded backgrounds. It does not appear that this approach to
* Professor of Law Washburn University School of Law. Of Counsel, Polsinelli, Shal-
ton & Welte, Kansas City, Missouri. I wish to thank Associate Professor Alex Glashausser
for contributing many helpful suggestions and valuable insights to this Article.
1. Hopwood v.Texas, 78 E3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that the University
of Texas Law School, despite a notoriously racist history, may not consider race in its ad-
missions process in order to attain a racially diverse student body). The Texas admissions
program appears to have been custom made for a challenge on Equal Protection grounds
since the plan segregated applications on the basis of race and subjected minority appli-
cants to a separate admissions process. This hardly seems to be in accordance with the
Bakke decision which simply held that race could be a "plus" factor that may be consid-
ered in a lawful admissions program. Univ. of Cal. Bd. of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
316-17 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring). See also Johnson v. Board of Regents of the Univ.
of Ga., 263 F3d 1234, 1244 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that pursuit of diversity must be
narrowly tailored).
2. Smith v. Univ. ofWash. Law School, 233 F3d 1188, 1197 ( 9th Cir. 2000) (finding
that diversity rationale may support a properly designed affirmative action program entail-
ing race conscious admissions).
3. Gratz v. Bollinger, 135 F. Supp. 2d 790 (E.D., Mich. 2001). The University of
Michigan is embroiled in discrimination litigation regarding its race-based admissions
process. Ironically, Michigan has established the importance of cultural diversity to its edu-
cational mission. However, it has thus far failed to show that its admission process merely
entails discrimination based upon cultural facilities. The Michigan admissions litigation is
the focus of a detailed University web page. UNIVERSITv OF MICHIGAN, Information on
Admissions Lawsuits, at http://www.umich.edu/-urel/admissions (last modified Nov. 2,
2001).The University could certainly accomplish much of its diversity goal by imposing a
regime of culture-conscious decision-making. Such a policy would probably have an only
marginally different entering class than that yielded by race-based decision-making. See
infra notes 177-83 and accompanying text.
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cultural diversity has yet been fully understood by either institutional or
legal authorities. Harvard and Justice Powell understand 4 but few appreci-
ate filly what they are saying.' If the goal of an institution is to achieve
increased cultural diversity then the best way of doing so is through deci-
sion-making that values cultural diversity Valuing cultural diversity is a
facially neutral consideration that is best practiced and viewed not as race-
conscious but instead as culture-conscious.6 Race need not be a proxy for
cultural diversity' Race and culture are overlapping and divergent." Cul-
ture crosses racial boundaries.9 People of any "race" may become
4. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-18 (Powell,J. concurring) (discussing Harvard's emphasis
on cultural diversity in its admission process).
5. All prior legal scholarship addressing diversity generally focuses upon whether it is
a justification for race-conscious measures, and not whether embracing diversity is a cul-
ture-conscious dimension of merit. This Article posits that culture-conscious initiatives can
accomplish much that affirmative action (i.e., race-based initiatives) can achieve in terms
of increasing opportunities for traditionally-excluded groups, without violating strictures
against racial discrimination. Some argue that affirmative action differs from seeking diver-
sity and that embracing diversity is, at least in the specific context of law school admissions,
a facially neutral and merit driven practice. See Arnold H. Loewy, Taking Bakke Seriously:
Distinguishing Diversity from Affirmative Action in the Law School Admissions Process, 77 N.C. L.
REv. 1479, 1480 (1999) (distinguishing diversity from affirmative action and stating that
"[w]here diversity is desirable, it is because it makes the institution better"). However, even
these scholars generally assume that valuing diversity is a race-conscious practice. Id. at
1501-02. See also, e.g., Lino Graglia, Professor Loewys "Diversity" Defense of Racial Preferences:
Defining Discrimination Away, 77 N.C. L. REv. 1505, 1507 (1999) ("Possible arguments for
advantaging some individuals on the basis of race-and therefore necessarily disadvantag-
ing others--are few and unpromising ... and diversity has become the new shibboloth.");
Amy L.Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1187-90 (1999) (analyzing eco-
nomics of diversity initiatives but failing to consider meritorious contributions of diverse
individuals to enhancement of productivity); Jim Chen, Diversity in a Different Dimension:
Evolutionary Theory and Affirmative Action s Destiny, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 811, 828 (1998) (stating
that diversity has thus far been ill-defined in the legal arena and that "if we would enter-
tain any hope of defining diversity, we had better consult analogous areas of... non-legal
knowledge."); Jennifer L. Hochschild, The Strange Career of Affirmative Action, 59 OHIo ST.
L.J. 997, 1016-18 (1998) (discussing business community's lack of interest in abolishing
affirmative action, but failing to comprehend the use of individual diversity contributions
as a dimension of merit). Some scholars object to the use of diversity as a justification for
racial justice on the ground that it furthers the exploitative needs of embedded White
supremacy; here too, the assumption is that diversity entails race conscious measures. E.g.,
Barbara Phillips Sullivan, The Gi of Hopwood: Diversity and the Fife and Drum March Back
to the Nineteenth Century, 34 GA. L. REv. 291, 293 (1999) (criticizing "diversity for its ser-
vice to [W]hite supremacy").
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra notes 118-50 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 184-203 and accompanying text.
9. Culture is in fact defined in non-racial terms. See THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTION-
ARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 488 (2d ed. 1987) (defining culture, in relevant part, as "the
behaviors and beliefs characteristic of a particular social, ethnic, or age group" and "the
[VOL. 7:33
A General Theory of Cultural Diversity
acculturated to cultural traits of other groups." Cultural diversity is
achieved by looking at a host of factors (i.e., geography, socio-economic
status, unique experiences) beyond race." So, if cultural experiences and
insights are a legitimate non-racial institutional value, and not just a proxy
for race-based decisions, making classifications based upon the possession
of cultural insights or experiences is not tantamount to making racial clas-
sifications, and therefore cannot run afoul of proscriptions on racial
classifications. 2 Such an approach to embracing diversity is not about ra-
cial fairness or remedying the racial hangover permeating our society after
centuries of race-based oppression." s Instead it is about the rationalization
of our nation's increasing diversity and the recognition that cultural diver-
sity is a strength, not a weakness. 4 A side benefit of embracing diversity is
increased opportunities for traditionally-excluded groups, but this side
effect is not due to a racial preference." Ironically, this side effect is due to
sum total of the ways of living built up by a group of human beings and transmitted from
one generation to another."); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 552
(1986) ("the total pattern of human behavior and its products embodied in thought,
speech, action, and artifacts and dependent upon [humanity's] capacity for learning and
transmitting knowledge to succeeding generations through the use of tools, language, and
systems of abstract thought" and "the body of customary beliefs, social forms, and material
traits constituting a distinct complex of tradition of a racial, religious, or social group").
Any racial dimension of culture is almost besides the point.Valuing cultural diversity means
valuing insights, understandings and experiences that flow from group affiliation or expo-
sure, not from skin color or other morphological features.
10. Acculturation means the "process of intercultural borrowing marked by the con-
tinuous transmission of traits and elements between diverse peoples and resulting in new
and blended patterns . WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 552 (1986).
11. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 321-24 (appendix to the opinion of Powell, J.) (reprinting
statement by Harvard describing its admissions program).
12. E.g., Eric Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering Practice
in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REv. 821, 847-48 (1997) ("Culture discrimination
is not necessarily wrong and may even be rational; anti-discrimination law allows it.").
13. Despite its high ideals and its relatively multicultural history, America has yet to
come to grips with its pervasively racist past. For example, American mythology still lion-
izes slave holders such as George Washington and Thomas Jefferson. Moreover, although
most Americans have a passing familiarity with the outrages perpetrated against African
Americans, few understand that until 1952 only "White persons" were eligible for natu-
ralization, or that as recently as 1954 our government launched a program known as
"Operation Wetback" that resulted in the deportation of over one million persons of
Mexican descent, citizens included. IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE By LAW 38, 43 (1996).
14. See JOHN P. FERNANDEZ, THE DIVERSITY ADVANTAGE 14-15 (1993) (noting that
America is uniquely positioned to exploit diversity to achieve greater international com-
petitiveness).
15. This is a vital side benefit. The costs of American White male supremacy are
enormous, albeit difficult to quantify. For example, respected commentators have raised the
specter of a race war if racial tensions in our country do not ease. E.g., RICHARD DELGADO,
THE COMING RACE WAR? AND OTHER APOCALYPTIC TALES OF AMERICA AFTER AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION AND WELFARE 119-27 (1996) (theorizing race war ignited by right wing extrem-
FALL 2001]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
our nation's racist past; traditionally-excluded groups benefit from an em-
phasis upon diversity because our nation needs a more culturally
polylithic power structure than what is currently in place to maximize the
opportunities implicit in an increasingly culturally polylithic environ-
ment.16
An example illustrates the point: a more diverse business environ-
ment is quickly taking hold in corporate America due to increasing
economic globalization and powerful demographic forces that promise to
leave America with a more diverse population than ever before." This
environment is causing business to embrace diversity and to find ways to
rationally respond to its new, more diverse environment. 8 One way busi-
ness is doing this is by rationally seeking employees with more cultural
diversity so as to attain a diverse workforce that can better understand and
communicate with more diverse consumers and other constituencies. 9
Along the way, business has discovered that a diverse workforce is more
creative, innovative, and, ultimately, more productive than a culturally
monolithic workforce.2 Diverse employees offer employers a new dimen-
sion of individual merit: the contribution of more culturally diverse
insights, experiences, and understanding.2 Such individual contributions
provide value to employers because, traditionally, corporate America has
been dominated by a single cultural perspective: that of the upper middle-
class White male.22 This value is naturally increasing in tandem with the
increasing diversity in the business environment.23 Employers that seek
cultural diversity seek insights, knowledge, and understanding, not skin
ists); CARt T. RowaN, THE COMING RACE WAR IN AMERICA 282 (1996) ("I must say hon-
estly that I doubt there is any way to prevent bloody racial strife in America").
16. The extent to which minorities have been excluded from mainstream America
and marginalized, even through the end of the 20th Century, is astounding. One commen-
tator recently noted that "African Americans now comprise 50.8 percent of [the] prison
population." RowAN, supra note 15, at 193.
17. Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity and the Boardroom, 4 STAN.J.L. Bus. & FIN. 85, 109-23
(2000) (providing detailed overview of increasing diversity in American business environ-
ment).
18. Id. at 88-90 (detailing efforts of corporate America to embrace diversity to en-
hance competitiveness).
19. Id. at 101 (citing studies showing that diversity facilitates communication).
20. Id. at 96-100 (citing studies showing enhanced creativity).
21. Id. at 102-03 (citing studies showing competitive advantage for firms embracing
diversity).
22. Id. at 90 n. 13 (citing statistics showing the continued exclusion of minorities and
women).
23. Id. at 106-07 (citing evidence of increased performance by companies embracing
diversity).
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color, and not ancestral characteristics." Similarly, seeking a diverse work-
force entails no racial preference; instead, all persons (regardless of race)
offer some ability to provide cultural insights.2" The question is what value
to place upon these insights.The answer will depend on whether the em-
ployer already has sufficient access to such insights or has a deficit of such
insights within its workforce. 6 Employers will rationally value those cul-
tural backgrounds that they need the most in light of their need for a
given cultural background and the cultural make-up of their preexisting
workforce.27 Certainly, this movement has pried open opportunities for
women, minorities, and other traditionally-excluded groups, but only be-
cause of the largely segregated nature of corporate America, not because
of any preferences.28 These initiatives are facially neutral, merit-driven, and
culture-conscious, not race-conscious.29 Thus, they do not violate anti-
discrimination law.
30
This Article seeks to extend the analysis of these developments in the
corporate world to anti-discrimination law under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.31 This Article will show that dis-
crimination based upon cultural insights or experiences is distinct from
race discrimination and will articulate a general theory of why and under
what circumstances this holds true. The difference between culture-based
discrimination and using culture as a proxy for race (Which would then
be race discrimination) requires a careful and non-mythological under-
standing of what race is, and what race is not. Moreover, showing that
culture discrimination is not prohibited by anti-discrimination law does
not really resolve much, as cultural discrimination carries the risks of
many of the evils our anti-discrimination laws are designed to address.3 1
24. Thus, these initiatives do not violate Title VII, which does not prohibit discrimina-
tion based upon contribution of more valuable insights. Steven A. Ramirez, The New
Cultural Diversity and Title VII, 6 MIcH. J. RACE L. 127 (2000) (showing that merit-driven,
facially-neutral and culture-conscious initiatives do not violate Title VII).
25. Id. at 128 n.3 (citing statements by diversity management experts that embracing
diversity means valuing all employees).
26. Id. at 149 n.108 (citing statements by diversity experts that merit requires an
analysis of institutional needs and institutional context).
27. See id. at 137 n.45 (citing study by economists showing that diversity is being
driven by need to rationalize a more culturally dynamic environment).
28. Id. at 131 n.13 (citing statistics showing that corporations embracing diversity are
hiring higher percentages of minorities).
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 (no state "shall deny to any person ... the equal pro-
tection of the laws").
32. The 20th Century has witnessed government sponsored and government coordi-
nated hate campaigns and group oppression based upon socio-economic class, religious
beliefs, race, political affiliation, ethnicity, and culture. Millions have died and millions more
have been stripped of fundamental human dignity and human rights. All of the suffering
has had the same root cause, manifested in particular circumstances against particular
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Therefore, this Article concludes with proposals for regulating cultural
discrimination so that fair discrimination based upon specific cultural fa-
cility, ranging from communication skills to cultural insights, is not
accompanied by the potential for parasitic cultural discrimination.33
A foundational element to fully comprehending the nuances of cul-
ture is a full understanding of what race is. Part I of this Article reviews
the putative definitions of race which form the foundation of racial dis-
crimination prohibitions. There is no scientific basis to race. Indeed, recent
genetic learning teaches that the morphological features that have tradi-
tionally defined racial categories are literally only skin deep. The concept
of race is instead largely based on the pseudo-science of yesteryear. Thus,
race is mythological; a function of legal and social construction. The key
issue underlying whether valuing cultural diversity violates racial dis-
crimination laws is the legal construction of race, particularly in the
context of the law of racial discrimination. Courts that enforce laws
against racial discrimination have essentially left "race" undefined and in-
stead rely upon an ad hoc analysis. Such an approach is understandable
given the lack of scientific basis to the term "race." But, in the end, this
part will show that "race" has always been legally constructed to turn
upon morphological features and heritable traits. Although it is conceiv-
able, perhaps even foreseeable, that morphological features will be a more
remote element of the legal construction of race, morphological links to
the legal construction of race are too deeply imbedded in our culture to
groups: the political expediency of indulging popular hatred, prejudice, and the need for
scapegoating, eliminating enemies, and asserting dominance. American slavery posed an
opportunity for our republic to come to grips with this phenomenon in the 19th Century
before mechanized murder and oppression were feasible. The logical end of the Equal
Protection Clause transcends slavery to prohibit all government sponsored and govern-
ment coordinated hatred and oppression. Many of the Framers of the Equal Protection
Clause seemed to recognize its transcendent purpose and the plain language of the
Amendment does not limit its applicability to "suspect classifications" nor to race. "The
39th Congress was intent upon establishing in the federal law a broader principle than
would have been necessary simply to meet the particular need and plight of the newly
freed Negro slaves." McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 296 (1976). See
also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 293 (citing statements from the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment to show that the Equal Protection Clause states a principle of "universal ap-
plication"). This Article seeks, however, only to fit cultural diversity initiatives within
existing Equal Protection doctrine, and not to fundamentally rework the basis for that
doctrine.
33. The protection individuals enjoy with respect to fundamental rights acts to pro-
tect any group, culturally defined or otherwise, from extreme forms of oppression or
discrimination. See CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAu & WILLIAM J. RICH, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw § 29.00 (2d ed. 1997). Of course, this has not prevented group based oppression that
stripped citizens of basic rights. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (up-
holding internment of American citizens ofJapanese ancestry).
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ever be eliminated from the legal construction of race. Consequently, dis-
crimination based upon cultural facility is not race discrimination,
because cultural skills do not require any particular morphological fea-
tures. This part of the Article concludes that race is an archaic concept,
and that any modern formulation of race would exclude discrimination
based upon cultural skills from racial discrimination prohibitions.
Cultural insights, understandings, and experiences are, however, non-
mythological and, in a given context, a legitimate source of value. Part 1I
of this Article examines both why and when morphological attributes are
relevant to the institutional value of cultural diversity. Cultural insights
and differences can be an important means of furthering an institutional
mission. It seems as though the more we study cultural diversity, the
clearer the benefits of diversity become. The benefits of cultural diversity
do not stem from morphology or genetic bonds to ancestry but from in-
sights that inhere to a unique cultural experience. The value of cultural
insights knows no racial boundaries. Institutions can be expected to ra-
tionalize their approach to these benefits by seeking individuals with
cultural backgrounds that have the most value to the institution based
upon a contextual analysis of need as well as a contextual analysis of an
individual's cultural background and experience. This analysis will increas-
ingly focus upon a nuanced inquiry and relegate race or morphology to a
side issue. Cultural diversity is important to a given institution generally
because its institutional reality is less polylithic than its institutional mis-
sion requires. Institutional missions generally require more diversity due
to a more diverse institutional environment, both domestically and inter-
nationally. Institutional realities lack multicultural facility and
communication skills because of an exclusionary tradition.This is the case
for diversity; it is utterly independent of morphology. This means of valu-
ing cultural diversity stands in stark contrast to America's tradition of
White supremacy; nevertheless, embracing cultural diversity is the ration-
alization of both America's increasing diversity as well as recent genetic
learning.
Part III of this Article provides a framework for integrating values of
cultural diversity (and to some extent the new learning from the world of
genetics) into the law of Equal Protection. This part of the Article will
provide a means for Equal Protection analysis to distinguish the rational
embracing of cultural diversity from invidious and pernicious discrimina-
tion. First, because cultural facility is real and not mythological this Article
concludes that discrimination based upon cultural abilities must be regu-
lated less strictly than discrimination based upon mere skin color. Second,
this part of the Article concludes that the Court must update its use of
language and express increased scrutiny of merit systems that transmit
embedded White supremacy as a means of accounting for the "new
genetics." Finally, the Article argues that, although not illegal, invidious
discrimination on any grounds, including cultural attributes, can lead to
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many of the evils we have witnessed again and again in this century and
throughout human history. Therefore, even though the Court has not ap-
peared anxious to protect individuals from discrimination based upon
cultural elements, the Court should insist that any culture-based discrimi-
nation be carefully scrutinized to assure that it is not used invidiously to
perpetuate discrimination, as the logic of race has been used in the past.
This Article concludes that it is not unconstitutional to truly value
cultural diversity. The ultimate implication of this Article is that proscrip-
tions against discrimination should be recast in a more rationalized and
ultimately broader concept of Equal Protection. In the end, this Article
suggests that the legal system begin coming to terms with the archaic na-
ture of the term "race" and the reality of America's increasing diversity
I.THE SCIENCE, PSEUDO-SCIENCE AND SOCIAL SCIENCE OF RACE
Race historically exists only as a tool of hierarchy based upon dis-
credited psuedo-science, and dates to the beginning of the period of the
western European conquest of most of the world.34 This section will at-
tempt to establish three points. First, modern science rejects the existence
of race and traditional racial categories on a biological and genetic basis.
Second, although there is no scientific basis to race, there is a historic
conception of race that is based upon 18th and 19th Century psuedo-
science, and which still holds sway today, much as it took almost four
hundred years for full acceptance of Galileo's rejection of an earth-centric
universe.35 Third, unfortunately, despite its mythological nature, our legal
system continues to adhere to a non-mythological, immutable conception
of race, with the United States Supreme Court leading the way.This sec-
tion of the Article concludes that, as presently conceived, the legal
construction of "race" has inherent morphological and genetic dimen-
34. See generally Roger Sanjek, The Enduring Inequalities of Race, in RACE 2, 10 (Steven
Gregory & Roger Sanjek eds., 1994) (stating that the "roots and growth" of an "interna-
tional racial hierarchy" developed as a justification for "conquest, dispossession, enforced
transportation, and economic exploitation of human beings" beginning in the 1400s; and
"that is what race is and all that it is").
35. The Catholic Church recently rescinded its condemnation of Galileo. William D.
Montalbano, Earth Moves for Vatican in Galileo Case, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1992, at Al ("The
Roman Catholic Church has admitted to erring these past 359 years in formally con-
demning Galileo Galilei. ). Continuing to extend racial mythology despite its lack of
foundation will expose "racists" to this same type of historical embarrassment. See Leonard
Lieberman, Alice Littlefield & Larry T. Reynolds, The Debate Over Race: Thirty Years and Two
Centuries Later, in RACE AND IQ EXPANDED EDITION 72 (Ashley Montagu ed., 1999) ("The
word is out, the Earth is no longer the center of this Universe. The word is spreading, the
human species is not divided into discrete races. A revolution is occurring in scientific
thinking.").
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sions. In the end, under the current conception of race, racial discrimina-
tion means discrimination based upon skin color, related morphological
features, and other heritable traits.
3 6
There is no scientific concept of race. 7 Instead of any racial "conti-
nental divide" to biological and genetic variation, such variation
(involving both visible and invisible biological traits) is expressed "con-
tinuously across continents"38 "Small local populations vary slightly from
each other as one proceeds from east to west from East Asia to Western
Europe, or north to south from Scandinavia to the Congo basin." 9 Facets
traditionally associated with "racial appearance," including skin color, hair,
and facial features, do not "abruptly and discretely stop and start."4 Most
importantly, "invisible biological and genetic features vary independently,
and not in accordance with traditional visible racial markers such as skin
color or hair form."41 Literally, one cannot judge genetic contents through
genetic packaging.42 Moreover, genetic variability of individuals within
putative racial groups exceeds genetic variability of individuals from dif-
ferent populations. 3 Thus, scholars have observed that instead of simplistic
racial categories, human biological variability should be thought of as
"marble cake, crazy quilt, and tutti-frutti."" Simply stated, skin color and
other racial markers have about the same significance as shoe size.4"
36. Yamamoto, supra note 12, at 847. See also Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Consti-
tution is Colorblind," 44 STAN. L. Rav. 1, 32 (1991) (citing Justice Scalia's focus upon
"blood" as indicative of a biologically based notion of race).
37. MAREK KOHN, THE RACE GALLERY 7 (1995) ("When Steve Jones, Professor of
Genetics at the Galton Laboratory of University College London, remarked ... that race
would not return to science, I objected that it was already thriving in psychology.Yes, he
replied, but not in science:"). See also Lieberman, Littlefield & Reynolds, supra note 35
(providing summary of surveys of anthropologists, content analysis of textbooks, mono-
graphs on human variation, research on human variation and media reports to document
the demise of"race" in science).
38. Sanjek, supra note 34, at 7.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. See also Kelly Owens & Mary-Claire King, Genomic Views of Human History,
286 Sci. 451, 453 (1999) (stating that genetics shows that "stereotypic" racial features are
"quite literally superficial, in that they affect exposed surfaces of the body" and "involv[e]
limited numbers of genes with very specific physiological effects").
42. Sanjek, supra note 34, at 7 ("There is more 'contents' than 'package' in our biologi-
cal makeup, and simplistic racial categories based merely upon a few 'package' traits hardly
constitute a scientific approach to biovariability").
43. Lieberman, Littlefield & Reynolds, supra note 35, at 84.At one point, this fact was
noted by the Supreme Court. See Saint Francis Coll. v. A1-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610 n.4
(1987) (and authorities cited therein).
44. Sanjek, supra note 34, at 7.
45. More scientifically stated:
Recent analysis of the melanocortin-stimulating hormone receptor gene
(MCIR) suggests that various alleles of this single locus may underlie
FALL 2001]
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More recently, geneticists have studied human genetic content as part
of the Human Genome Project, a monumental undertaking in which
scientists from around world are mapping the human genetic code.46 One
extension of this endeavor is the Human Genome Diversity Project
(HGDP), which is looking at the human genetic code to catalogue and
define human biological variability.47 Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza is the head
of this effort, and has emphatically stated that traditional racial markers are
literally skin deep.48 Geneticists who have carefully studied non-visible
much of observed human variation in skin and hair color. This variation is
largely due to varied amounts of eumelanin (brown and black melanins)
and phaeomelanin (red and yellow melanins) produced by melanocytes.
Eumelanin protects against ultraviolet (UV) radiation, whereas phaeome-
lanin may contribute to skin damage, including melanoma, induced by
UV The balance of melanins is regulated by melanocyte-stimulating hor-
mone, which acts through its receptor. Amino acid sequence variants
occur at multiple sites in the second transmembrane domain, the first ex-
tracellular domain, and the seventh transmembrane domain of the MCIR
protein.Variation at these sites was found in more than 80% of individuals
with red hair and fair skin that burns rather than tans, but in less than 4%
of British or Irish individuals with skin that tans without burning, and in
no African individuals. Among Asians, still other amino acid substitutions
in MCIR are common. Nucleotide diversity at MCIR is several times
higher than the average nucleotide diversity in human populations. High
nucleotide diversity, coupled with common variation at nonsynonymous
sites, suggest that MCIR variation is an adaptive response to selection for
different alleles in different environments, possibly to differences in day
length and hence available sunlight at different latitudes. If true, variation
at this locus, which encodes evolutionarily important but superficial traits,
has been the cause of enormous suffering.Variation in other traits popu-
larly used to identify "races" is likely to be due to similarly straight-
forward mechanisms, involving limited numbers of genes with very spe-
cific physiological effects. Of course, prejudice does not require a rational
basis, let alone an evolutionary one, but the myth of major genetic differ-
ences across "races" is nonetheless worth dismissing with genetic evidence.
Owens & King, supra note 41, at 453 (citations omitted).
46. See Human Genomics:The Home Straight, THE ECONOMIST, May 13,2000 (providing
overview of Human Genome Project).
47. See Elizabeth Pennisi, NRC OKs Long-Delayed Survey of Human Genome Diversity,
278 Sci. 568 (1997) (summarizing mission of HGDP).
48. Scott Winokur, Maybe We're Better Off Back in the Family of Man, S.F EXAMINER,
Apr. 25, 2000, at A19 (quoting Cavalli-Sforza: "It is because they are external that these
racial differences strike us so forcibly ... and we automatically assume that differences of
similar magnitude exist below the surface ... [t]his is simply not so."); Sharon Begley, Three
is not Enough: Surprising New Lessons From the Controversial Science of Race, NEWSWEEK, Feb.
13, 1995, at 67 (reviewing findings of Human Genome Diversity Project and interviewing
project Chair, Luca Cavalli-Sforza: "The more we learn about humankind's genetic differ-
ences ... the more we see that they have almost nothing to do with what we call race.").
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human variation "have confirmed that homogenous races do not exist." ' 9
Morphological features that have traditionally served as racial markers are
only superficial genetic differences that have evolved in response to differ-
ing climatic conditions; only a few genes of little significance are
responsible for these features."0 Indeed, not only does "race" not exist, but
giving any content to the scientific meaning of the term would require
either that the number of racial categories be sufficient to account for
innumerable local genetic variations or that twenty generations of geneti-
cally engineered inbreeding be undertaken."s This is because genetic
differences of populations represent less than 8% of human genetic varia-
tion and no major genetic discontinuities across populations have been
observed. 2 Moreover, most human variation predates the migration of
humans out of Africa. 3 Geneticists posit that the concept of relatively
homogeneous groups with major biological differences is inconsistent
with genetic evidence. 4 In sum, if race is defined as some arbitrary level
of statistically significant genetic divergence between population groups,
such variability is provided by insular local populations instead of visible
morphological features.1
5
Some do still believe in race. 6 Fundamentally, however, those arguing
in favor of some scientifically based concept of race must fail. First, there
49. LUIGI LUCA CAVALLI-SFORZA, GENES, PEOPLES, AND LANGUAGES 13 (2000).
50. Id. at 9-13. Geneticists specifically reject any genetically based differences in intel-
ligence. See MATT RIDLEY, GENOME: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A SPECIES IN 23 CHAPTERS 86
(1999) ("There are differences between average IQ scores of [B]lacks and [W]hites, but
there is no evidence that these differences are themselves heritable. Indeed, the evidence
from cross-racial adoption suggest that the average IQ of [Bilacks reared by and among
[W]hites is no different from that of [W]hites.").
51. CAVALLI-SFORZA, supra note 49, at 13 (stating that pure races do not exist and
would have to be artificially created through "inbreeding" for "at least" 20 generations); Id.
at 25-27 (stating that population of Ithaca, New York is probably sufficiently genetically
divergent from Albany, NewYork to be deemed separate races).
52. Lieberman, Littlefield & Reynolds, supra note 35, at 84 (summarizing the results of
three genetic studies).
53. CAVALLI-SPORZA, supra note 49, at 27.
54. Owens & King, supra note 45, at 452-53.
55. CAVALLI-SPORZA, supra note 49 at 25-27.
56. See Begley, supra note 48, at 67 (stating that as recently as 1989, only 70 % of cul-
tural anthropologists and 50% of physical anthropologists reject race as a biological
category). Psychologists too are wedded to the three race model. It allows them a simple
and easy means of organizing many of their test results and other findings. Id. at 67. One
such spectacle arose in 1995, when two psychometricians attempted to convince the
American public that there were racial differences in intelligence, and that therefore, af-
firmative action should be radically modified. RICHAR, D J. HEmRNSTEIN & CHARLES
MURRAY, THE BELL CuRVE 340 (1994) (arguing that writers should "avoid flamboyant
rhetoric about ethnic oppression" as an explanation for inequalities and accept that racial
and ethnic differences in standards of living and other important areas stem from differ-
ences in "cognitive ability"). Their thesis has been subjected to powerful attack. See
Ramirez, supra note 24, at 151-54 (summarizing evidence against racially based differences
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is no better evidence regarding biological variation than the human ge-
netic code. Consequently, the failure of geneticists to uncover any
genetically defined racial boundaries undercuts any biological basis to pu-
tative racial differences. Second, even in the absence of definitive genetic
evidence showing the existence of no tenable racial categories, it appears
relatively clear that no system of racial classifications can account for vast
human genetic diversity.5 7 Third, those believing in race ignore the futile
history of any attempts to place race upon a scientific foundation. 8
Once upon a time, scientists tried to show that race existed as a
physical reality turning upon skull measurements. 9 Samuel Morton me-
ticulously studied cranium measurements of various groups, finding that
Whites had the biggest heads, and inferentially the most brain power of all
the races. It was not until almost 1977 that this pseudo-science was shown
to be ill-founded and biased.6" Anthropologists attempting to create pi-
geon holes within which to fit human diversity have at various times
concocted anywhere from 3 to 100 racial groups.61 Over time, no coher-
ent means of any racial classification system has ever emerged, and some
efforts are almost laughable but for the pervasive human suffering that has
invariably accompanied racial demarcations.
For centuries, scientists have tried in vain to give the concept of race
a scientific basis. In 1795, for example, one prominent system of racial
classification provided for five curious divisions: Caucasian, Mongolian,
Ethiopian, American, and Malayan.62 The term Caucasian was selected by
Johann Friedrich Blumenbach because of the geographic proximity of
Mount Caucus to the homeland of what he felt to be the most beautiful
in intelligence). See also Lieberman, Littlefield & Reynolds, supra note 35 at 84 ("While
individuals vary in their inherited intelligence, the claim that large subdivisions of the
human species also vary in that regard has been demonstrated by a century of debate over
race and IQ to be no more than the product of pseudoscientific imagination.").
57. CAVALI-SFORZA, supra note 49, at 30 (stating that there may be 1,000,000 geneti-
cally distinct social groups on Earth).
58. THOMAS F GossETT, RACE: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN AMERICA 69 (2d ed. 1997)
("The Nineteenth Century was a period of exhaustive and ... futile search for criteria to
define and describe racial differences.").
59. Sanjek, supra note 34, at 5.
60. Id. (citing STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASUR OF MAN 50-62 (1981)). The
efforts to articulate some principled basis to categorize humanity into races, and the re-
lated quest of finding genetically based human intelligence is pocked by "scholarship"
tainted by bias and even fraud. CAVALLI-SFORZA, supra note 49, at 188-89. See also generally
Jeffrey Rosen & Charles Lane, The Sources of the Bell Curve, in THE BELL CURVE WAs 58-
61 (1995) (reviewing discredited sources).
61. CAVALLI-SFORZA, supra note 49, at 27.
62. JOHN S. HALLER, JR., OUTCASTS FROM EVOLUTION: SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDES OF RACIAL
INFERIORITY 1859-1900 4-5 (2d ed. 1995) (reviewing 19th Century pseudo-science re-
garding race).
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race of man-the Georgian.63 Blumenbach based his racial classification
system upon skin color, hair, and skull and facial characteristics." Anthro-
pologists built upon this foundation and busily set about to measure the
differences in physiology that could be attributed to racial differences.65
Indeed, this kind of anthropometry was the focal point of anthropology
throughout the 20th Century.66 Ultimately, this effort led to the idea of a
"facial angle. ' 67 This angle was formed by two lines: one from the bottom
of the nose to the forehead, and the second from the bottom of the nose
to the orifice of the ear. 68 Supposedly, the greater the angle, the higher the
indicated intelligence; once again, the Caucasian scientists assumed that
Caucasians had the greatest facial angle of any racial group.
69
Charles Darwin tried to base racial categories upon the attractiveness
of an individual to different kinds of lice.7" J. Philippe Rushton, a leading
psychometrician, tried to build racial categories based upon the distance
semen traveled when a male ejaculated.7" While none of this is very flat-
tering to those who have attempted to place race upon a scientific basis, it
is ultimately upon this sordid foundation that the social and legal con-
struction of race rests.
Race does function, despite its lack of scientific basis, in the social
realm, where it acts to categorize individuals based upon perceived mor-
phological features, ancestry, and individual volitional choices as to racial
identity" Complex social conventions attach to a given set of morpho-
logical features and are associated with a specific racial identity.73 This
process mirrors yesteryear's pseudo-science. As a result of this process,
63. Id. at 5.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 7.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 9-14.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 11.
70. GoSSETT, supra note 58, at 81.
71. Henry A. Giroux & Susan Searles, The Bell Curve Debate and the Crisis of Public
Intellectuals, in MEASURED LIEs:THE BELL CuRvE EXAMINED 80 (Joe L. Kincheloe, Shirley R.
Steinberg & Aaron D. Greesson III eds., 1996). It would be somewhat redeeming to state
that Rushton hails from the 1920s or even the 19th Century; but in fact Hernnstein &
Murray relied upon Rushton's work in the Bell Curve, and specifically defend him against
charges of being a crackpot. Rosen & Lane, supra note 60, at 60 (quoting Rushton as stat-
ing: "It's a trade-off: more brain or more penis.").
72. Ian F Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion,
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HAV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 7 (1994) ("1 define race as a vast
group of people loosely bound together by historically contingent, socially significant
elements of their morphology and/or ancestry."). Professor Haney Lopez summarizes
scientific evidence regarding racial categories and the sordid scientific history of race in
great detail. Id. at 11-18 (equating belief in race to belief in the "Easter Bunny.").
73. Id. at 27-52.
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individuals experience vastly different cultural realities. 74 This difference in
cultural experience has a wide range of consequences that may be mani-
fested in anything from scores on so-called intelligence tests to criminal
incarceration rates. 7 These indicia of a fundamental divergence in social
experience with no genetic explanation are emblematic of a society
mired in racial oppression.7 6 However, for purposes of this Article, the im-
portant consequence of "race" is that the unique cultural experiences
associated with a racial identity provide a basis for institutions to achieve
enhanced innovation, creativity, small group action, and broader institu-
tional cultural facility.
77
Where science has failed, society has succeeded. America has always
been plagued by racial categories, and these categories benefit from both
social and legal sponsorship.78 Although science could only find nonsensi-
cal racial categories, it prostituted itself to society's need for a racial
hierarchy. Nonetheless, social mores and law need not rest on a rational
basis.79 Indeed, racial fabrication and government sponsored categoriza-
tion continues to exist through the beginning of the 21st Century.8
Pseudo-science failed, but that same pseudo-science lives on today in the
form of the social and legal construction of race, which essentially mirrors
that psuedo-science. 81 Society was a jealous mistress to the effort of scien-
74. Id. at 38-39 ("Race is revealed as historically contingent, socially mediated sys-
tems of meaning that attach to elements of an individual's morphology and ancestry.").
75. See Ramirez, supra note 24, at 150-52. Indeed, one could use such divergent indi-
cia to construct an index of racial oppression that could be used to test various societies
and their "success" in constructing categories that have social significance. Such an index
would likely not cast American society in the most favorable light globally. See Craig
Turner, UN Study Assails US. Executions as Biased Justice, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 4, 1998, at Al
(reporting United Nations finding that death penalty in the U.S. is tainted by racism).
76. Indeed, at least one commentator has explicitly posited that divergent standardized
test scores are evidence of a social caste system. John U. Ogbu, The Consequences of the
American Caste System, in THE SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT OF MINORITY CHILDREN 19 (Ulric
Neisser ed., 1986). See also Ramirez, supra note 24, at 151 ("Alleged IQ differentials stem
from pervasive social oppression.").
77. See infra Part II.
78. HANEY LoPEz, supra note 13, at xii.
79. Owens & King, supra note 41.
80. An example of the complex relationship between the social mores, psuedo-science
and the law of race is the U. S. Census Form. See POPUlATION CENSUS BUsREu, Race and
Ethnicity in the Census: 1860 to 2000, at http://www.prb.org/AmeristatTemplate.cfin?
Section=RaceandEthnicity&template-/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfin&Content
ID=3553 (last visited Nov. 13, 2001) (providing a chart summarizing the highly dynamic
racial categories used on census forms from 1860-2000). In 1860, there were three races:
White, African American and mulatto. In 2000, there are 21.
81. HANEY LOPEZ, supra note 13, at 13 (arguing that the history of science has long
been the history of failed attempts to justify racial social beliefs).
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tists.8 2 In the end, science could only work to reflect the social mores of its
cultural context.8 3 Indeed, when science failed in the effort to construct
race, it was rudely dismissed." Thus, the pseudo-science of race is no more
than reflective of cultural demands for a racial hierarchy. It is upon this
same pseudo-scientific basis that our legal system has defined race. Law
has played a central role in the social construction of race." Racial
fabrication has always involved an admixture of law, pseudo-science and
social mores.86
The definition of race has been legally synthesized in a number of
contexts, most notably in the naturalization and race discrimination con-
texts. In the naturalization context, the Court defined race in terms of
whether a given individual was a "White person" for purposes of satisfy-
ing the prerequisites for naturalized citizenship. 7 In Ozawa v. United
States"s the Court was faced with a Japanese petitioner seeking citizen-
ship. 9 The Court held that he was not a member of the race "popularly
known as Caucasian" and rejected his bid for citizenship.90 The Court spe-
cifically invoked "numerous scientific authorities" that held Japanese
persons to be "clearly of a race which is not Caucasian."91 It is noteworthy
that in its exercise of racial fabrication, the Ozawa Court specifically relied
upon both "popular" beliefs as well as "scientific." In United States v.
Thind 92 the Court rejected an Asian Indian's bid for citizenship because
"the understanding of the common man" did not put Asian Indians
82. HALLER, supra note 62, at x ("What this study intends to show is the manner in
which their science provided a vocabulary and a set of concepts which rationalized and
helped to justify the value system upon which the idea of racial inferiority rested in
American thought.").
83. United States v.Thind, 261 U.S. 204,214 (1922) (holding that racial term "Cauca-
sian" should be interpreted in accordance with "common speech" because "scientific
manipulation" had extendedWhite race too far).
84. Id.
85. HANEY LOPEZ, supra note 13, at 9 ("The prerequisite cases compellingly demon-
strate that races are socially constructed. More importantly, they evidence the centrality of
law in that construction").
86. See supra notes 72-85 and accompanying text.
87. HANEY LoP'z, supra note 13, at 5.
88. 260 U.S. 178, 189-90 (1922) (holding that a person who was a resident of the U.S.
for 20 years, who was a graduate of an American high school, who studied at the Univer-
sity of California, could not become a naturalized citizen because he was "of the Japanese
race.").
89. Id. at 189.
90. Id. at 197 (stating that the words of the statute import a "racial meaning" and that
"individual" color is irrelevant because "even" Anglo-Saxons range from "fair" to
"swarthy").
91. Id. at 198.
92. 261 U.S. 204, 210 (1922) (holding that an "Aryan" of "high caste Hindu stock"
could not naturalize because the "Aryan theory" has been discredited by ethnology as a
"racial basis.").
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within the White race, even though "scientific manipulation" had so in-
cluded Asian Indians.9 3 It is interesting to note that the Court recognized
in Thind that racial categories were untenable.94 The Court noted the lack
of scientific success in defining racial categories.9" Still, the Court contin-
ued its exercise in racial fabrication in finding that "White" meant a
"racial" group defined by the "common man" as a "Caucasian" that is of
European descent. 96 Moreover, this newly fabricated race was focused
upon "physical group characteristics" that could "merge into the mass of
our population."97 Thus spoke the Supreme Court in fabricating the
"White" race.
In each of these cases, the Court synthesized race based upon the
same popular thinking that led science to strain beyond all rationality to
validate both "race" and a racial hierarchy.98 When science fell out of step
with "the understanding of the common man," it was no longer deemed
valid science.9 In sum, even if the Court did not completely defer to sci-
entific categories of racial groups, these cases treated race as immutable
and supported by pseudo-science with regard to the significance of mor-
phological features and ancestry. Significantly, this means that the process
93. Id. at 211 ("The word Caucasian is ... at best a conventional term ... which,
under scientific manipulation, has come to include far more than the scientific mind sus-
pects.").
94. Id. at 212 (stating that racial categories suffer from "irreconcilable disagreement"
and that "the innumerable varieties of mankind run into one another by insensible de-
grees.").
95. Id. ("Blumenbach has five races; Keane following Linneaus four; Deniker, twenty-
nine:').
96. Id. at 213-15.
97. The Thind court posited:
It is a matter of familiar observation and knowledge that the physical
group characteristics of the Hindus render them readily distinguishable
from the various groups of persons in this country commonly recognized
as White. The children of English, French, German, Italian, Scandinavian,
and other European parentage, quickly merge into the mass of our popu-
lation and lose the distinctive hallmarks of their European origin. On the
other hand, it cannot be doubted that the children born in this country of
Hindu parents would retain indefinitely the clear evidence of their ances-
try. It is very far from our thought to suggest the slightest question of
racial superiority or inferiority. What we suggest is merely racial differ-
ence, and it is of such character and extent that the great body of our
people instinctively recognize it and reject the thought of assimilation.
Id. at 215. Like Ozawa, the Court in Thind relied upon a blend of science and common
understanding. Id. at 210 (excluding "Aryan Theory" because of"modern" technology).
98. Supra notes 78 to 86 and accompanying text.
99. Thind, 261 U.S. at 211 (rejecting "scientific manipulation" of who gets the privi-
lege of being a Caucasian).
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of racial fabrication was freed from any scientific mooring and anchored
only by judicial divination of "popular" thought or "scientific" authority,
as the Court saw fit. In other words, "race" is ultimately refined from the
highest extent ofjudicial fiat and forged from popular social views.
Nor has the Court in more modern times come to grips with the
lack of any scientifically based racial grouping. In 1987, the Court did
note the futility of racial classifications, but then proceeded to treat race as
an immutable element of individual genetic reality.'O' Most recently, in
Rice v. Cayatano,"' the Court seemed to assume that people are born into
an immutable racial category of some sort that proceeds from some dis-
tinct physical characteristics. 2 The Court relied upon the use of lines of
"ancestry" and "physical characteristics" to find a "racial classification. 10 3
The Court certainly did not reject "race" as a tenable basis for grouping
individuals, nor did the Court take the opportunity to discredit or debunk
racial mythology. Instead, the Court actually extended the construction of
races by finding a whole new racial classification, essentially created by
judicial fiat."°4 And, the Court even went further, seemingly laying down a
formulation for the continued legal viability of the construction of race:
the Court stated that racial discrimination is that which singles out "iden-
tifiable classes of persons ... solely because of their ancestry or ethnic
characteristics."'"' In no case has the Court bothered to justify its approval
of a continued process of racial fabrication; thus, speculation is the only
means to explain the Court's interest in continuing the law's leading role
in the social construction of race."°6 It is not as if there is a dearth of
accessible learning that the Court could draw upon in demolishing the
facade of race. 7 After Rice, the Court is in uncharted territory in terms of
100. See Saint Francis Coll. v.A1-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604,610 n.4 (1987). Ultimately the
Court held that a plaintiff must show discrimination for being "born" into an "identifi-
able" group with "genetically" transmitted "ethnic or ancestral characteristics." Id. at 613.
101. 528 U.S. 495, 513 (2000) (holding that classification benefiting those Hawaiians
with ancestors dating before 1778 on Hawaiian islands was a racial classification because
ancestry was used as a proxy for race).
102. Id. at 513-14 (stating that Hawaiians in 1778 "shared common physical character-
istics:' "had a common culture' and that therefore a classification based upon ancestral
lines was racial discrimination).
103. Id. at 513-17.
104. Id. at 517. The Court recognized that both the burdened class and the benefited
class were largely of the same "race"-that of"Polynesians*" Id. at 543 (Stevens, Ginsburg,
JJ., dissenting). See also Id. at 515 (stating that just because some members of the "Polyne-
sian" race were excluded from the classification, did not preclude finding of racial
discrimination). At no point did the Court state where it found a basis for a Polynesian
race. It seems as though "race" remains within the sphere ofjudicial fiat.
105. Id. at 515 (citing Saint Francis Coll. v.A1-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604,613 (1987)).
106. If the Court were to review the history of race it would find that White suprem-
acy is at the bottom of the construct. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
107. See MICHAEL OMI & HowARD WNANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED
STATES FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990s 55 (2d ed. 1994) (emphasizing that the social nature
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finding "races." Race still vexes the Court and the Court still brandishes it
to get the results it seeksjust as it did in Ozawa and Thind.
Certainly, the Court is to be applauded for its sensitivity to laws that,
without basis, treat distinct groups (defined genetically or ancestrally) with
enhanced or diminished recognition or respect.""8 Still, given the heinous
history of the concept of race and its utter lack of scientific viability, do-
ing so under the auspices of race seems ill-advised at best."9 Moreover,
given the Court's central role in racial fabrication, it would seem appro-
priate to exit the business of race.110 The core problem is that people really
do not belong to any "race." "I So, any statement of Equal Protection tied
to that concept is doomed to suffer from logical infirmities. The Court
has shown some inclination to move to ancestry as an exclusive basis of
Equal Protection." 2 There is strong support for such a shift; still, if Gover-
nor Hatfield awards a state contract to some contractor other than a
McCoy should this kind of "ancestral" discrimination really rise to Equal
Protection magnitude?"'
of race, the absence of any essential racial characteristics, the historical flexibility of racial
meanings and categories, and the irreducible political aspect of racial dynamics); Anothy
Appiah, The Uncompleted Argument: Dubois and the Illusion of Race, in "RAcE," WRITING, AND
DIFFERENCE 22 (Henry L. Gates ed., 1985); Haney Lopez, supra note 72, at 6 ("overwhelm-
ing evidence proves that race is not biological"). Indeed, the Supreme Court has
previously cited a plethora of scientific evidence debunking racial mythology. Saint Francis
Coll., 481 U.S. at 610 n.4.
108. E.g., Rice, 528 U.S. at 515.
109. See supra notes 13, 34, 37-71 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 78-97 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 37-56 and accompanying text.
112. Rice, 528 U.S. at 513 (flirting with equating any ancestral test with a race-based
classification); Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 613 (stating that "distinctive physiognomy" is
not essential to show race discrimination and emphasizing "ancestry or ethnic characteris-
tics"). In Rice, the Court was forced to find a "racial" classification because the case was
decided under the Fifteenth Amendment, which expressly prohibits denying or abridging
voting rights on "account of race." Rice, 528 U.S. at 514. Of course, "under prior cases,
discrimination on the basis of ancestry ... violates the Equal Protection Clause?' Saint
Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 613 n.5.
113. Perhaps the problem is simply intractable.The Court could articulate a theory of
Equal Protection that secured individuals from government sponsored hatred or oppres-
sion based upon any macro group affiliation. There is little logical significance to a genetic
bond among such victims. Groups may be bound together culturally, geographically, socio-
economically, politically or morphologically. Oppression is still oppression. See supra note
32. The Court has never endorsed such an expansive view of Equal Protection but if ex-
panded protection against irrational group discrimination is the goal, it should do so
directly, not by breathing new life into the already rotten carcass of race.The Court stands
alone, isolated from both rational scientific thought and scholarly analysis, into manipulat-
ing group identity into a new racial regime. See supra notes 34-55 and accompanying text.
The only role left for the concept of race in a rationalized regime is to prohibit strictly
discrimination based upon the pseudo-scientific racial categories (i.e. categories based
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In any event, Rice makes clear that the Supreme Court has not yet
come to terms with the archaic nature of "race" and seems fundamentally
unable to relegate race to the ash bin of history while still preserving the
central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause in eliminating discrimina-
tion on the basis of pseudo-scientific race."' Moreover, Rice reaffirmed the
importance of group "physical characteristics" in the process of racial fab-
rication and the creation of some kind of genetically immutable racial
categorization." ' Thus, in the Supreme Court's continuing efforts to le-
gally construct some concept of race, physical characteristics and ancestry
have played a pivotal role in the definition of race."' Culture, to the extent
that it plays any role in the fabrication of races, is an afterthought at
best.' In fact, the Court has refused to protect individuals from discrimi-
nation based upon cultural attributes, even when those attributes seem to
be in pursuit of weak values and could easily be emblematic of invidious
discrimination against sub-racial groups."'
So, to date, the Supreme Court has hardly progressed beyond the
pseudo-science of yesteryear. The Court seems to insist there is some basis
to categorizing people based upon morphological characteristics and an-
cestry.119 As hard as it is to expound any logical basis to "race" based upon
the Court's opinions to date, it always requires some genetic bond, some
heritable trait, and some "identifiable" characteristic. 2 ' Culture, cultural
experience, and cultural insights do not fit this "racial" bill. They are sim-
ply not heritable.
II.THEVALUE OF CULTURAL DIVERSITY
Culture is different from race, and although there is a unique cultural
experience associated with race, there is no unique cultural perspective
upon morphological features on a direct or ancestral basis) of yesteryear. See supra notes
56-77 and accompanying text.There is no need to extend "race" further.
114. Indeed, the Court constructed a new construct: "racial purpose." Rice, 528 U.S. at
513-14."Whatever that might mean." Id. at 1071. (Stevens,J., dissenting).
115. Id. 513.
116. See id.
117. See id. (noting that before 1778, the inhabitants of Hawaii had a "common cul-
ture").
118. See Hernandez v. NewYork, 500 U.S. 352,361-63 (1991) (upholding exclusion of
Spanish speaking jurors, in trial of Latino, based upon finding that such jurors "might have
difficulty" in accepting the translator's rendition of Spanish-language testimony).
119. Before Rice, there was broad agreement among scholars that the Court believed in
race and that race essentially meant skin color or other morphological features. SeeYama-
moto, supra note 12, at 847 ("For a majority of the current Supreme Court race is skin
color. Race is thus seen as an immutable, biologically determined trait."); Haney Lopez,
supra note 72, at 17 (noting Supreme Court's understanding of race as biologically deter-
mined-a matter of"blood"); Gotanda, supra note 36, at 17 (same).
120. See supra notes 100-02, 112 and accompanying text.
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that can be associated with race in a monolithic fashion."' The reality of
race and culture is that members of the same race can have radically dif-
ferent cultural experiences and perspectives."' Individuals can become
acculturated to certain elements of a racial identity while retaining their
own racial identity. 2 3 Others may retain a racial identity that is largely
divorced from the mainstream culture associated with that identity.
124
Thus, one cannot infer a given cultural experience with a certain "race.
1 2
Each of these propositions flows from the legal construction of race
articulated by the Supreme Court, which has always been dependent on
some genetically transmitted morphological features.1 21 It is axiomatic that
culture is not genetically attached to those genes that influence the legal
construction of racial morphological features. 2 ' In other words, our ra-
cialized society can influence, but not dictate, cultural experiences,
identity, and knowledge.' The reality of a non-genetic and non-
morphological culture-based value is also manifest in the empirical and
theoretical case supporting the benefits of cultural diversity. This Article
focuses upon the case in support of cultural diversity in two related con-
121. See generally Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARv. L.
RiEv. 1745, 1801 (1989) (urging caution regarding "ideas about the naturalness, essentiality,
and inescapability of race" because such ideas "have for too long stunted American Cul-
ture").
122. See CoRmNE WEST, RACE MATTERS 25-27 (1993) (stating that "[B]lack authentic-
ity" is a construct and that "[B]lackness has no meaning outside of a system of race-
conscious people and practices . .. being [B]lack means [only] being minimally subject to
[W]hite supremacist abuse .... ").
123. Thus, the term "acculturation." See supra note 10.
124. Because culture is defined as accumulated learning, including that handed down
from generation to generation, cultural transmission is defined to reflect this. Thus, there
are two primary modes of cultural transmission: vertical and horizontal. CAVALLI-SFORzA,
supra note 49, at 179-83.Vertical transmission is from parent to child; horizontal transmis-
sion includes all other pathways. Id. at 180. Consequently, ancestry plays a role in cultural
transmission, but acculturation also occurs independently of ancestry. See also generally
Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza, M. Feldman, K. Chen & Dornbusch, Theory and Observation in
Cultural Transmission, 218 Sci. 19-27 (1982).
125. Scholars generally speak of "race" as involving genetically transmitted traits and
culture as involving learned traits. See CAVALJ-SFORZA, supra note 49, at 9 (stating that race
involves characteristics determined by "genetic differences" while culture involves traits
dictated by "education"). By definition, culture can vary separate and apart from genetic
makeup. Id. at 175 ("Culture, or the ability to learn from the experience of others is a
special phenomenon that relies on communication.").
126. See supra notes 87-120 and accompanying text.
127. Owens & King, supra note 41.
128. Certainly, race in our society is so powerful that some race-correlated cultural
traits may be handed down vertically; still, the possibility of significant horizontal influence
diminishes any element of "racial" determinism to culture. CAVAILI-SFORZA, supra note 49,
at 176 (stating that "cultural mutations" occur randomly).
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texts: corporate America and higher education admissions. These areas
enjoy a well-developed body of research into the benefits of cultural di-
versity, as well as the nature of such benefits. As such, they demonstrate
that the benefits of cultural diversity are fundamentally non-
morphological and non-heritable. Instead, institutions that value cultural
diversity seek specific mental capabilities, such as cultural perspectives,
insights, and skills.
The thinking that is driving corporate America to hire more persons
than ever before from traditionally-excluded backgrounds is not that skin
color will enhance performance. The business world, as could be expected,
has taken the lead in rationalizing its approach to America's diverse popu-
lations by managing diversity to increase profitability. '29 Specifically, the
business world is showing how to manage diversity to provide more inno-
vative thinking, to spark creativity, to provide superior marketing insights,
and to better manage more diverse workforces. '30 On virtually all of these
fronts, business is exploiting the fundamentally different cultural insights
and experiences of traditionally-excluded groups.131 In addition, corporate
America is learning that diversity initiatives create a positive environment
for all employees, and thereby give employers a competitive advantage in
an increasingly tight job market.'32 In no case does the business approach
129. See generally Ramirez, supra note 24, at 128-29 (citing detailed evidence showing
that leading elements of corporate America are enthusiastically embracing diversity).
130. Poppy Lauretta McLeod, Sharon Alisa Lobel & Taylor H. Cox, Jr., Ethnic Diversity
and Creativity in Small Groups, 27 SMALL GROUP RES. 248, 252 (1996) (comparing quality
and feasibility of the ideas of "Anglo" working groups and racially/ethnically diverse
groups and concluding that culturally diverse workforces create competitive advantage
through better decisions). This study is supported by numerous psychological authorities
that demonstrate that diversity in a wide-range of contexts can lead to better decision-
making. E.g., IRVING L. JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTINK 192 (1972) (undertaking intensive
case studies of"groupthink;" and finding: "Groups of individuals showing a preponderance
of certain personality and social attributes may prove to be the ones that succumb most
readily to groupthink."); IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTmINK 250 (2d ed. 1982) (undertaking
further intensive case studies and finding that group heterogeneity can stem "groupthink").
131. Certainly, it is not skin color or ancestry that leads to deeper thinking, but the
ability to provide unique insights or unique perspectives. Morphological features and an-
cestry logically do not act to achieve these benefits. It is not as if having an African
American sit in on meetings, like a potted plant, will spark greater innovation by sheer
force of dark skin. Contrast these benefits to the usually illegal exploitation of morpho-
logical features, ancestry or "racial nepotism." See Ferrill v. Parker Group, Inc., 168 E3d
468,472 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that employer may not hire and fire persons of a given
race solely to engage in marketing effort targeting a specific racial group). The concept of
"racial nepotism" has been developed by Derrick Bell. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOT-
TOM O THE WELL 56 (1992) (stating that members of a racial group will tend to favor their
own group).
132. Margaret L. Williams & Tayla N. Bayer, The Effect of a Managing Diversity Policy on
Organizational Attractiveness, 19 GROUP ORG. MGMT. 295, 305-06 (1994) ("Firms that have
adopted policies and procedures concerning managing diversity may be able to enhance"
their recruiting efforts).
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to cultural diversity depend upon exploiting an individual's morphologi-
cal features. 133 Thus, the business case for embracing diversity depends not
upon exploiting an element of race but a consequence of race-the
unique cultural experience and insights that arise from complex social
conventions.
The same is true with respect to the benefits of diversity in the con-
text of education. Here, too, cultural diversity helps to facilitate the
institutional mission of colleges and universities."' A diverse student body
provides a learning environment where problems are attacked from more
diverse view points.3 ' Students consequently learn more and think in
133. See generally Ramirez, supra note 24 at 145-48.
134. See Patricia Gurin, Expert Report of Patricia Gurin, 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. 363, 364
(1999) ("A racially and ethnically diverse university student body has far ranging and sig-
nificant benefits for all students, non-minorities and minorities alike.").This expert report
was submitted by the University of Michigan in the litigation challenging its admission
policies. THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, supra note 2.The use of expert reports submitted
in litigation warrants caution. In this instance, the reports are seemingly more reliable, as
the plaintiffs in the Michigan litigation have submitted no expert reports contesting the
value of diversity in education. Instead, the plaintifl have submitted an analysis of the
statistical probability of admission members of specified ethnic backgrounds face in apply-
ing to the University. See Kinley Larntz, Expert Report of Kinley Larntz, Ph.D., 5 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 463, 472 (1999) (concluding that membership in certain ethnic groups is an
"extremely strong factor" in achieving admittance to the University of Michigan law
school). In fact, it appears that the plaintiffs do not contest that diversity is important to
the University's educational mission. CENTER FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, Plaintiffs Memoran-
dum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, at http://www.cir-usa.org/
legal-docs/grutter v bollingersummary.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2001) (Plaintiff's
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment). In any event, be-
cause objectivity may possibly be questioned, I cite the expert reports only as useful
summaries of otherwise standard scholarly sources, or when supported by such sources.A
growing body of such scholarship clearly supports Professor Gurin's views. AMER. COUNCIL
ON EDUC. & AMER. Assoc. OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, DOES DIVERSITY MAKE A DIFFERENCE?
THREE RESEARCH STUDIES ON DIVERSITY IN COLLEGE CLASSROOMS 3 (2000), available at
http://www.acenet.edu/programs/omhe/diversity.cfin ("The limited scholarship that does
exist has consistently shown that racial and ethnic diversity has both direct and indirect
positive effects on ... educational outcomes.").
135. One scholar implemented a descriptive, multiple case study of three classrooms at
the University of Maryland. Patricia Marin, The Educational Possibility of Multi-
Racial/Multi-Ethnic College Classrooms, in DOES DIVERSITY MAKE A DIFFERENCE? 61 (Amer.
Council on Educ. ed., 2000). Dr. Marin found that broader student backgrounds provided
a basis for realizing important educational goals such as challenging stereotypes and devel-
oping critical thinking skills. Id. at 70-71. See also Gurin, supra note 134, at 373 ("having
multiple voices in the classroom-and the multicultural teaching strategy of presenting
multiple perspectives ... fosters fully reflexive thinking"). A new psychological study shows
that cultural influences lead to different modes of thought. A true education must stress
understanding different modes of thinking and exploiting different modes of thinking. See
Richard E. Nisbett, Kaiping Peng, Incheol Choi, Ara Noronzayan, Culture and Systems of
Thought: Holistic v. Analytical Cognition, (finding that East Asian and Western thought differs
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deeper, more complex ways in a diverse educational environment. 136 Di-
versity also facilitates the ability of students to function in a pluralistic
democracy.3 ' Moreover, "students who are exposed to a multicultural
education through course work increase their level of racial awareness and
understanding of multiple cultures." '138 The results of recent surveys sup-
port all of the evidence regarding the educational value of diversity.
Eighty percent of White graduates from elite universities favor retaining or
increasing their school's emphasis on diversity.139 Similarly, seventy percent
of law students responding to a survey regarding the benefits of diversity
in the law school context reported that diversity has positively impacted
the quality of their education. 4 ° Remarkably similar numbers were ob-
tained by a survey of college faculty. 4' It is fair to say that impressive
substantially, East Asian being more holistic and Westerners being more analytic) (working
paper, on file with the author). The authors posit that different modes of thought result
from a host of different social and cultural factors. Id. at 1.
136. In a detailed multi-disciplinary analysis of research literature on diversity in educa-
tion, Professor Jeffrey F Milem concluded that students who engaged in more interactions
with diversity while in college show relative gains in critical thinking and active thinking.
Jeffrey F Milem, The Educational Benefits of Diversity: Evidence from Multiple Sectors, in COM-
PELLING INTEREST: EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE ON RACIAL DYNAMICS IN HIGHER EDUCATION
Chapter 5, 11 (Mitchell Chang et al. eds., 2000) (preliminary draft of American Educa-
tional Research Association) available at http://www.stanford.edu/-hakuta/racial_
dynamics/book download.htm). See also Gurin, supra note 134, at 370 ("Students learn to
think in deeper, more complex ways in a diverse educational environment."). Professor
Gurin's study was based on far ranging data involving students from across the nation and
at the University of Michigan. Id. at 380. While it is true her analysis was conducted for
litigation, it mirrors the finding of the effects of diversity in sparking creativity and innova-
tion in the world of business. See supra note 130.
137. Milem, supra note 136, at Chapter 5, 11 ("Students who have been exposed to
greater diversity are more likely to show increases in racial understanding, cultural aware-
ness and appreciation, engagement with social and political issues, and openness to
diversity and challenge."). See also Gurin, supra note 134, at 367 ("One goal embraced by
most colleges and universities ... is to prepare young people for active participation in our
democratic society, which is an increasingly diverse society.").
138. Maureen T Hallinan, Diversity Effects on Student Outcomes: Social Science Evidence, 59
OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 753 (1998) ("existing studies provide evidence that racial and ethnic
diversity on college campuses promotes learning, increases understanding of racial groups
and cultures, reduces racism and prejudice, and leads to cordial relationships between stu-
dents of different racial and ethnic heritage.").
139. WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSE-
QUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 251 (1998).
Even those graduates who did not gain admission to their first choice school favored an
emphasis on diversity as strongly as students who got into their first choice school. Id.
140. GARY ORFIELD & DEAN WHITLA, DIVERSITY AND LEGAL EDUCATION: STUDENT Ex-
PERIENCES AT LEADING LAW SCHOOLS (1999), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/
groups/civilrights/publications/lawsurvey.html.
141. Geoffrey Maruyama & Jose F Moreno, University Faculty Views About the Value of
Diversity on Campus and in the Classroom, in DOES DIVERSITY MAKE A DIFFERENCE? THREE
STUDIES ON DIVERSITY IN COLLEGE CLASSROOMS 15 (2000) (finding that 69.8% and 70.7%
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evidence supports the benefits of diversity in higher education in prepar-
ing students to excel in a multicultural world and a more diverse America.
Additionally, the educational mission of institutions of higher learn-
ing cannot be divorced from the needs of corporate America or American
society generally. Many commentators have recognized that because cor-
porate America needs a more diverse workforce, America's colleges should
produce a more diverse group of graduates.'42 Indeed, this mandate per-
meates all levels of our educational system.We as a society need to address
why it is that so many students from traditionally-excluded groups are
inadequately educated and thereby excluded from the highest levels of
our society.' It is also clear that much of the divergence in the "qualifica-
tions" of minority group members versus "Caucasians" is directly
attributable to standardized tests.'44 As previously mentioned, these tests
have been shown to reflect embedded societal racial bias.' In other
words, the college admissions process is saddled by merit measurements
that transmit racial oppression into education, where they function to shut
doors to the very opportunities that can allow individuals to escape op-
pression. 46 Ultimately, American business will suffer from these policies of
exclusion as tightening labor markets take a slow toll on growth. 4 All of
this is in the name of standardized tests designed by psychometricians,
when geneticists tell us that there are no race-based differences in abil-
ity."'48 This is a grim result for American business, American education,
of college faculty surveyed found diversity important for teaching students to examine
their perspectives and exposing students to new perspectives, respectively).
142. E.g., Gurin, supra note 134, at 367 ("the business community is looking to colleges
and universities to produce highly valued cognitive skills and social skills: ability to work
effectively in groups with colleagues of diverse backgrounds, openness to new ideas and
perspectives, and empathy with other workers' perspectives").
143. See Ramirez, supra note 17, at 112-14 (summarizing evidence of continuing and
pervasive racism).
144. See Larntz, supra note 134, at 488-90.
145. Supra note 76 and accompanying text.
146. Ramirez, supra note 24, at 158.
147. Ramirez, supra note 17, at 91 n.14.
148. There is no magic to standardized test scores. In fact, questions are selected by one
criteria: correlation to academic performance. Claude M. Steele, Expert Opinion of Claude
M. Steele, 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. 439, 441 (1999).Thus, the only thing these tests measure
are "aptitude" which is neither achievement (i.e., what a candidate has learned) nor innate
ability. Id. at 441-42. Only the U.S. uses such a test, even though achievement tests are
better predictors of academic success. Id. at 442. Professor Steele has previously published a
landmark study on the pernicious effects of "stereotype threat" on the scores of minority
students on standardized tests. See Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and
the Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHo. 797
(1997). Essentially, stereotype threat occurs when one is subjected to a negative stereotype.
This threat disrupts high stakes test performance. Steele, at 444. Thus, when African
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American students, and American society. 49 A Rand Corporation study
suggests that colleges are not meeting the needs of corporations because
college graduates are lacking the cross-cultural competencies that are
sorely needed for our nation to compete in a more globalized economy."'
At the dawn of the 21st Century, the unfortunate truth is that "all
too many Americans today live in separate racially homogenous worlds." '
Consequently, "the mists of racial misunderstanding becloud the shared
visions and aspirations and the common struggles that have the potential
to bring us together " '2 It is clear that if cultural diversity is not appropri-
ately valued, this same pathological segregation will burden American
higher education and relegate its students to an inferior educational re-
sult."5 3 Valuing cultural diversity gives institutions the ability to turn a
societal albatross into an institutional strength." 4 Since it is viewed as fun-
damentally merit-driven, valuing cultural diversity can be achieved
Americans were told that they were taking an "ability" test, their performance suffered
"dramatically;" when told it was a "problem-solving" test they scored as well as Whites. Id.
at 445.
149. General Motors has in fact submitted an Amicus brief in the Michigan litigation
stating that: "In General Motors' view, only a well-educated, highly-diverse workforce,
comprised of people who have learned to work productively and creatively with individu-
als from a multitude of races and ethnic, religious, and cultural histories, can maintain
America's global competitiveness in the increasingly diverse and interconnected world
economy" GENERAL MOTORs, News Release: GM Files Brief in Support of U of M in Affirmative
Action Lawsuits, July 17, 2000, available at http://209.61. 155.43/news/releases/
gOO0717a.html.
150. Tora K. Bikson & Sally Ann Law, Global Preparedness and Human Resources:
College and Corporate Perspectives (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author).
151. Thomas J. Sugrue, Expert Report ofThomasj Sugrue, 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. 261.265
(1999).
152. Id. at 266.Those who doubt that race still matters in America should consider this
sobering assessment from a recent federal investigation:
Our nation still struggles with the impact of its past policies, practices, and
attitudes based on racial differences. Race and ethnicity still have pro-
found impacts on the extent to which a person is fully included in
American society and provided the equal opportunity and equal protec-
tion promised to all Americans. All of these characteristics continue to
affect an individual's opportunity to receive an education, acquire the
skills necessary to maintain a good job, have access to adequate health
care, and receive equal justice under the law.
PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE ON RACE, ONE AMERICA IN THE 21ST CENTURY: FORGING A NEW
FUTURE 2 (1998).
153. See Larntz, supra note 134, at 472 (stating that Michigan gave ethnicity "strong"
weight in attempting to achieve diversity).
154. PRESIDENT'S INITIATIvE ON RACE, supra note 152, at 1 ("America's greatest promise
in the 21st Century lies in our ability to harness the strength of our racial diversity.').
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without creating additional tensions or generating racial resentment. 5'
Institutions are therefore faced with a choice of allowing pervasive segre-
gation and oppression to impede their ability to achieve their missions or
embracing the potential benefits of cultural diversity as a means of ration-
ally responding to a diverse environment. 15 6 Evidence showing the
benefits that can be achieved from embracing cultural diversity explains
why so many educational and business organizations are pursuing such an
approach."17
Both the business context and the educational context illustrate the
far-ranging potential benefits of diversity. Neither serves to define those
benefits. In virtually any institutional context, there are likely to be bene-
fits from embracing cultural diversity."8 In law enforcement, in order to
understand and facilitate interaction with "racial" communities, police
departments would want to hire individuals with a cultural experience
with such communities."5 9 Although it is certainly true that race as legally
and socially constructed has nothing to do with fire fighting ability,"w spe-
cific cultural linguistic skills certainly could help firefighters learn critical
information rapidly in ways that may save lives-either by locating a fire
or people imperiled by fire, or for treatment of those victimized by fire. 
161
155. Both the Bowen and Bok study, in the context of higher education, and the Wil-
liams and Bayer study, found that organizational attractiveness is enhanced when diversity
is emphasized. See supra notes 132, 139. It also seems that emphasizing the cultural insights
that diversity offers, in a merit-driven fashion, as opposed to simply emphasizing "race:'
amplifies organizational attractiveness. Williams & Bayer, supra note 132, at 305-06 (com-
paring "affirmative action" to cultural diversity).
156. Supra notes 129-50 and accompanying text.
157. E.g., Ramirez, supra note 17, at 102-09; Hallinan, supra note 138, at 753-54.
158. See supra notes 129-50 and accompanying text. There are also benefits to morpho-
logical diversity (in the sense of features that constitute traditional racial identity) are
important in a given context. Here, a "compelling interest" must be found to justify
unlocking any putative racial diversity benefits. See e.g., Baker v. City of St. Petersburg, 400
F.2d 294, 301 n.10 (5th Cir. 1968) (acknowledging that the purpose of infiltrating Black
crime, or in a time of racial strife, assignment of police officers based on race may be com-
pelling); Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 917-18 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding race-based
hiring when faced with experts claiming that operation of juvenile boot camp for delin-
quents justified morphological and ancestral discrimination).
159. See Talbert v. City of Richmond, 648 F.2d 925,928-29 (4th Cir. 1981) (upholding
that interest in diversity justified race-based hiring). See also Deborah Ramirez & Jana
Rumminger, Race, Culture and the New Diversity in the New Millennium, 31 CUMB. L. REv
481,501 (2001) ("diverse police forces strengthen police community relations").
160. McNamara v. City of Chicago, 138 E3d 1219, 1222 (7th Cir. 1998) (rejecting
diversity rationale based upon lack of evidence that White firefighters could not discharge
their duties as well as non-White firefighters, although the city's affirmative action policy
was still upheld).
161. Judge Posner specifically allowed that a diverse fire fighting force may enjoy ad-
vantages over an all White force. The Court held, however, on this point, that the city had
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Indeed, there is reason to believe that any institution that has a need to
effectively communicate with the full breadth of American or world cul-
ture will benefit from cultural diversity.162 Similarly, any institution that
relies upon group decision-making can expect benefits from diversity.'63
Any institution that addresses problems can benefit from the deeper more
multi-faceted thinking that is provided by culturally diverse groups.'64 In
short, more work needs to be done to define the benefits of cultural di-
versity in a myriad of institutional contexts, but the general theory of
cultural diversity predicts specific non-morphological, non-ancestral
benefits arising from cultural insights and facility in a plethora of areas.
An important element of the value of cultural diversity is the grow-
ing empirical data validating the benefits of cultural diversity in a specific
context. In the business arena there are studies showing that firms manag-
ing cultural diversity achieve greater innovation and creativity,6s provide a
more attractive workforce to potential workers,'66 and, ultimately, achieve
enhanced market performance.'67 In the education context, empirical data
supports the benefits of cultural diversity in terms of creating a more dy-
namic learning environment and graduates that are better prepared to deal
with a more multicultural society.168 All of this empirical data shows the
value of cultural diversity and not specific morphological features. 169 Cul-
tural facility is divorced from race, as no specific cultural insights or
experiences are genetically transmitted. 170 Indeed, it is not just the addi-
tion of morphologically diverse individuals that triggers the institutional
benefits that diversity practitioners seek.'7 ' Rather, institutions must man-
age diversity in a way that logically works to unleash the benefits of
cultural diversity. 7 2 This illustrates the divergence of race from culture;
genes do not dictate cultural facility and do not ensure the benefits of
cultural diversity' 73 As a consequence, the empirical data supporting the
case for diversity very often includes assumptions, implied or expressed,
failed to submit evidence showing such benefits. McNamara, 138 F3d at 1222. See also
Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that racial classification was justi-
fied by evidence demonstrating law enforcement need for racial diversity).
162. See supra notes 132,137-38 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 132, 137-38 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 135.
165. See supra note 130.
166. See supra note 132.
167. See supra note 23.
168. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 133.
170. See supra note 124.
171. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 120-28 and accompanying text.
173. Supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
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that diversity be properly managed. 174 Because morphological features
alone do not logically support the benefits of cultural diversity, commen-
tators recognize that institutions must strive to create environments that
will unleash the valuable cultural facility and perspectives that institutions
seek.1 71 Obviously, valuing cultural diversity means looking for ways to
make cultural diversity pay for an institution, as the benefits of cultural
diversity do not accrue by dint of mere skin color.'76
This does not diminish the power of valuing cultural diversity in
terms of extending opportunities to traditionally-excluded groups. This
power can be thought of in theoretical terms or from a very pragmatic
perspective. Theoretically, diversity will pay dividends so long as an institu-
tion faces a deficit of valuable culturally-based insights, in light of its
institutional needs and the extent of its monolithic cultural tradition.
1 77
The more exclusive the institutional tradition, the more opportunities for
individuals that offer cultural diversity.7 8 The more diverse the relevant
institutional environment, the more cultural diversity is likely to prove
valuable. 1 7 From a pragmatic view, the numbers of traditionally-excluded
persons who stand to benefit from institutional adoption of cultural diver-
sity initiatives seem to exceed those who benefit from "affirmative
action." 8 ' For example, those corporations valuing cultural diversity hire
from within traditionally-excluded groups at a disproportionate rate-
sometimes exceeding over 50 percent of new hires."1 Some such corpora-
tions have boards or a group of officers and managers that also reflect a
174. Ramirez, supra note 17, at 109-24 (extrapolating best diversity practices from
empirical data).
175. Milem, supra note 136 at Chapter 5, 31 (stating that having a diverse campus will
not in and of itself guarantee educational benefits, and that diversity must be properly
managed).
176. Ramirez, supra note 24, at 147.
177. See supra notes 17-30 and accompanying text.
178. Ramirez, supra note 24, at 147.
179. For example, Proctor & Gamble markets its products to the flil array of American
diversity, peddling household names from Tide to Ivory to Crest. Proctor & Gamble is a
leader in using diversity to enhance its marketing efforts. Diversity, ADvERTISING AGE, Feb.
16, 1998, at S1 ("When we started getting more diverse ... we started getting richer [mar-
keting] plans.") (alteration in original).
180. At those companies, for example, that have the strongest records for managing
diversity, minorities are hired at rates far above their respective population rates. See Ed-
ward Robinson & Jonathan Hickman, The Diversity Elite, FoRTu,July 19, 1999, at 62, 66
(stating that 56 percent of Union Bank's new hires are minorities). Nor, is Union Bank
alone; virtually all of Fortune's "Diversity Elite" post impressive numbers.Thirty-one of the
listed companies had minority new-hire rates above 35%. See generally id.
181. Id.
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polylithic approach to assembling senior management teams.182 Certainly,
it is fair to say that these corporations mean business about cultural diver-
sity.
183
As America continues its great multicultural odyssey, "race" will
likely continue to diverge from culture and the whole concept of racial
identity will lose gravity and become more complex. 84 The descendants
of Thomas Jefferson provide a high-profile, but likely common, exam-
ple. 8 As is well known by now, Thomas Jefferson took his role as
founding father quite seriously'86 In addition to his White family, Jefferson
fathered a number of African Americans, at least as conventionally de-
fined.8 7 The Jefferson-Hemings family illustrates the separateness of race
and culture as well as the utter instability of race. One branch of the Jef-
ferson-Hemings family tree rejects any African American link and has
acculturated into the mainstream majority population-in other words,
they have "passed" into White America.88 The other branch of the Jeffer-
son-Hemings family morphologically also appears what would
conventionally be termed White, but rejects anything other than African
182. Id. at 62 (noting that 35.9% of Union Bank's officers are minorities, as are 7 of 17
directors).
183. See generally Ramirez, supra note 24, at 128 n.6, 131 n.13,133 n.20.
184. See, e.g., Angela P Harris, Foreword: The Unbearable Lightness of Identity, 11 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 207, 211 (1996) ("The problem is that 'identity itself' has little substance:").
Identity is contextual, any identity category is a continuum, all human beings have claims
to multiple categories, and identity may be ascribed by the self or others. Id. at 210-11. In
short, the very concept of racial identity is a mess.
185. Over the years the question of whether Thomas Jefferson fathered any children
with his slave Sally Hemings has been a controversial question in the academic world.The
dominate position of historians was essentially that it just could not be. JOSEPH J. ELLIS,
AMERICAN SPHINX: THE CHARACTER OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 305 (1996) ("Within the schol-
arly world, especially within the community of Jefferson specialists, there seems to be a
clear consensus that the story is almost certainly not true.").
186. Eric S. Lander & Joseph J. Ellis, Founding Father, 396 NATURE 1314 (1998) ("DNA
analysis now confirms that Jefferson was indeed the father of at least one of Hemings'
children"). The DNA analysis of the issue of Jefferson's paternity has been a powerful
influence in resolving much of the debate surrounding this question.There is now a broad
consensus that Jefferson fathered children with his slave Sally Hemings. Indeed, even the
Thomas Jefferson Memorial Foundation, which had resisted claims of Jefferson's paternity,
appointed a research committee to study the DNA evidence.They concluded that there is
a high probability that Jefferson fathered Eston Hemings and probably all six of Sally
Heming's children. THOMAS JEFFERSON FOUNDATION, REPORT OF THE RESEARCH COMMIT-
TEE ON THOMAS JEFFERSON AND SALLY HEMINGS (2000), available at http://www.monticello.
org/plantation/hemings-report.html.
187. Fronline:jeffersons Blood (PBS television broadcast, May 2, 2000), transcript available
at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/fiondine/shows/jefferson. In this Article, "convention-
ally defined" means in accordance with prevailing societal definitions in modern as well as
18th and 19th Century America.
188. Id. (statement of Shelby Steele) (noting that "vast majority of Hemingses" had
passed into the "White world" but some parts of Madison Hemings' family clung to Afri-
can American identity).
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American identity and culture."9 The two branches have the same essen-
tial DNA insofar as racial morphology and ancestry is concerned
(hereinafter, for lack of any suitable term, "racial DNA") and so the "race"
of each branch seems to turn upon cultural volition and identity voli-
tion.'" Presumably, the "White branch" would have standing to sue if it
suffered from a state-imposed racial classification that benefits African
Americans; and the branch with the same "racial DNA' but a different
racial identity, would have standing to sue if it suffered from a state-
imposed racial classification benefiting Whites. 9 ' The law has not really
faced up to this variable reality to racial identity; the Supreme Court has
always assumed that one is "born" with a racial identity that is immutable
and genetically defined.192 Eventually, there will probably be some recog-
nition that people are entitled to their own racio-ethnic identity, but there
is reason to doubt that our world is presently equipped to deal with such
a regime.'93
Now, consider the Jefferson-Hemings family but shift the focus from
"racial DNA" to culture. Because culture is real and not founded on my-
thology, each family has fundamentally different cultural experiences and
perspectives, despite having nearly identical "racial DNA."194 Where an
189. Id. (statement of Belinda Hilliard) ("If you ask me what color I am, I am going to
tell you I am [B]lack. I am not going to tell you I'm mixed because I'm not mixed ... a lot
of people have a hard time understanding that it's not purely the color of your skin that
makes you [B]lack.").
190. Id. (statement of Amalia Cooper) (noting that at a reunion of many Jefferson-
Hemings descendants, including those maintaining White identity and those maintaining
African American identity,"I was sort of nervous to go there. And all of a sudden I walked
into this room of people that looked ... like us.").
191. E.g., Saint Francis Coll. v. AI-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 ("If respondent on re-
mand can prove that he was subjected to intentional discrimination based on the fact that
he was born an Arab, rather than solely on the place or nation of his origin, or his religion,
he will have made out a case under § 1981").
192. Id.
193. For example, if the "White"Jeffersons applied to University ofVirginia, could the
state deny them the status of an African American applicant? Under current Supreme
Court doctrine it would appear that they possess the "ancestry and ethnic characteristics"
to pass as African Americans, even though they previously passed as White. Given the ab-
surd nature of race as a scientific concept, can the state force a person to accept a racial
category? Race is simply untenable. American society is on the verge of a massive racial
identity crisis. Harris, supra note 184, at 210-11. After all, we all have ancestral lines to
Africa; we are all African American. Law cannot deny this, for it would be the ultimate
exercise in racial fabrication to create some arbitrary generational cut off to qualify for
some identity. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
194. Frontline, supra note 187 (statement of Shelby Steele) ("If Jefferson's descendants
are unconvincing as a family, they are nevertheless struggling with their relatedness to each
other. But, their racial identities attach them to so much history, give them territories to
defend, grudges to settle, quilts to redeem.").
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institutional mission is furthered by including persons who understand
the stresses accompanying racial passing, the "White branch" Jefferson-
Hemings would have an advantage regardless of their "racial DNA. "'1 9
Meanwhile, the African American Jeffersons can almost certainly offer
some rather unique views on the reality of racism in America; indeed, it
may well be that an African American with the appearance of a White
person can see racism like neither an African American who looks African
American, nor a White person.96 In any event, both groups of Jeffersons
offer unique cultural insights and experiences in very different ways, de-
spite the fact of the high degree of similarity in terms of "racial DNA"
and related morphological features. '
Establishing the overlapping and divergent nature of culture and race
is just the beginning of the analysis. There must be more than "culture in
the air"-there must be some basis for finding valuable cultural insights.
The premise of cultural diversity is that all persons offer cultural insights
and experiences. 9 Thus, returning to the Jefferson clan, it is true that, in
our highly racialized society, both sets of Jefferson descendants offer a
unique set of cultural attributes.'99 Still, selecting one over the other on
the grounds of culture identification alone may be tantamount to racial
discrimination. Only culture differs. And, if culture is deemed to differ in
every instance that race differs, then culture truly is only a proxy for race.2 "
Holding one set of cultural attributes to be superior to the other is pre-
sumptuous and indulgent of race-based stereotypes, and is thus contrary
195. Id. (statement of Shelby Steele) ("To pass out of a race always requires one to pass
out of a family.").
196. Rev. Thomas Woodson, an African American Jefferson, offered the following in-
sights on being an African American with a White appearance:
I lived in a [W]hite neighborhood. I played with [W]hite children. And if
one of them got beat up by a [B]lack, then I had a whipping coming.
But then, it was a two-fold thing. If I went into the [BIlack neighborhood
to go to school, and one of them got beat up by a [W]hite, they would
call me, you know, "Hey, you're one of them [Wlhite niggers." So then
there would be a fight. It was not that it would be my fault, it was just the
fact that they had to have an outward release of anger. And I fit the bill.
Id.
197. See supra note 190.
198. Ramirez, supra note 24, at 129-30 ("These initiatives do not allow for any racial
preference ... and draw any bias [in terms of actual employment decisions] not from the
inherent values of diversity but from the largely segregated pre-existing corporate tradition
.... In other words White males can be and are hired in the name of cultural diversity.")
(citing reports of diversity trailblazers hiring White males in the name of cultural diver-
sity).
199. See supra notes 189, 196 and accompanying text.
200. In Rice, the Supreme court made clear that race discrimination will not be toler-
ated under cover of some proxy. Rice v. Cayatano, 528 U.S. 495,513 (2000) (striking down
use of ancestry as a proxy for race).
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to the general theory of cultural diversity."' It is simply too easy to say
"no persons of African American culture need apply" instead of"no Afri-
can Americans need apply" Valuing cultural diversity does not turn,
however, upon general cultural preferences. 22 Central to valuing cultural
diversity is a focused and targeted pursuit of specific cultural facility, not
merely cultural identity.0 3 Unfounded cultural preferences are anathema
to embracing cultural diversity-the whole point is for the institution to
allow individuals with all cultural backgrounds to flourish."° It is this fun-
damental embrace of all cultural backgrounds that renders cultural
diversity a facially-neutral value. But, in order to be facially neutral mere
cultural identity cannot support cultural diversity; instead the merit must
be found in specific cultural facilities. "Merit" serves to separate specific
valuable cultural attributes from those having no value, but only in con-
text.
Merit is also a slippery concept. High SAT scores, for example, seem
ill-suited for measuring most skills, and would be an irrational basis for
measuring many skills, like musical aptitude °.2  But, there is a growing rec-
ognition that merit is best defined as those individual attributes that serve
to most further the institutional mission of the entity at issue, with a spe-
cific focus on the need at hand.' °6 If the institution is a consumer products
201. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
202. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, BEST PRACTICES Or PRI-
VATE SECTOR EMPLOYERS 261 (1997) (diversity initiatives should include all employees,
including White males, and should not result in unfairness), available at http://
www.eeoc.gov/task/prac2.htnl.
203. Supra notes 129-50 and accompanying text. It would not be logical to conclude
that mere cultural identification yields the benefits promised by diversity theory; instead it
is unique perspectives that drive diversity.
204. "[Managing diversity] means enabling every member of your workforce to per-
form to his or her potential. It means getting from employees ... everything they have to
give." R. Roosevelt Thomas, Jr., From Affirmative Action to Affirming Diversity, HAW. Bus.
REv, Mar./Apr. 1990, at 107, 112.
205. Id.
206. A "report card" on diversity in business explains:
To admit on the merits, then, is to follow complex rules derived from the
institution's own mission and based on its own experiences of educating
students with different talents and backgrounds.These rules should not be
thought of as abstract propositions to be deduced through contemplition
in a Platonic cave. Nor are they rigid formulas that can be applied me-
chanically. Rather, they should be rough guidelines that are established
rarely through empirical examination of the actual results achieved over
long experience. For a school, that means asking how many students with
characteristic x have done well in college, contributed to the education of
their fellow students, and gone on to make major contributions to society.
The specifics of these rules will differ from one institution to another be-
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conglomerate seeking to penetrate upper middle-class Virginians, then it
would seem wiser to hire the White Jeffersons to assist with that task.
20
1
Therefore, the first element to establishing cultural diversity as a legitimate
measure of merit is a showing of institutional need for some non-
morphological, non-ancestral (i.e., non-racial) cultural insight, knowledge,
or experience.
A second element of merit is that it must be individually based.28
Again, if mere membership in a racial group is "meritorious," then there is
little difference between culture based discrimination and racial discrimi-
nation.2° Only under the most narrow circumstances is race a legitimate
measure of merit-in the sense that morphological and ancestral features
really can be a non-invidious part of an institutional mission. 210 Conse-
quently, there must be some individualized assessment that a given
cause no two schools are identical--some place more emphasis on re-
search, for example, some have deeper pools of applicants, and so on. The
criteria should also be expected to change as circumstances change and as
institutions learn from their mistakes.
As is the case with selective colleges and universities, top companies
throughout the United States have more applicants than they can hire for
professional jobs. Like the academic institutions, companies and other or-
ganizations need to decide whether it is in their interest to have a diverse
workforce. Increasing diversity does not mean setting quotas or accepting
unqualified applicants. But it probably requires being sensitive to race
when setting recruiting policies, and it surely requires a greater degree of
thoughtfulness about merit.The overriding lesson is that making progress
on diversity requires a thoughtful articulation of the meaning of merit in
the specific context of the organization.
Above all, merit must be defined in light of what an institution is trying
to accomplish.
William G. Bowen, Derek Bok & Glenda Burkhart, A Report Card on Diversity, HA~v. Bus.
R.Ev.,Jan./Feb. 1999, at 139, 144-45.
207. Indeed, there are instances where prominent diversity practitioners have hired
White males in pursuit of cultural diversity. See supra note 198. See also Frontline, supra note
187 (statement of Diana Redman) ("I think about [relatives who have passed], and I think
they have a very difficult row to hoe because their experience will be--continues to be
the experience of people who were raised in the [Wihite world, raised [W]hite in that
world.").
208. E.g., Univ. of California Bd. of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,299 (1978).
209. See supra note 200.
210. E.g., Hunter v. Regents of the Univ. Of Calif., 190 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1999) (up-
holding race based admissions into university's laboratory school which was conducting
research into improving urban education);Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996)
(allowing race-based hiring because of evidence that juveniles would not respect authority
at a boot camp run by only Whites); Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n of N.Y, Inc., v. City of
NewYork, 74 F. Supp. 2d 321 (S.D. N.Y 1999) (holding that "operational needs" may sup-
port transfer of minority police officers to precinct with minority population in order to
quell riot).
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candidate is likely to promote the institutional need for cultural diversity.
This means that there must be some reason beyond race for supposing
that a given individual has the cultural insights, knowledge, or experience
needed to further the institutional mission. For a decision to be culture-
conscious, the culture-based value, not race, must be decisive. Interviews,
personal statements, and other more nuanced inquiries are indicative of a
bona fide investigation for cultural facility than mere reliance upon racial
categories. Only through such a process can an institution rationalize its
approach to cultural diversity in terms of a dimension of merit."'
Finally, valuing cultural diversity is a facially neutral practice.212 Valu-
ing cultural diversity means a fundamental institutional appreciation for
the potential value of all cultural perspectives.213 There can be no cultural
preference in such an environment.2"4 If there is any bias resulting from
cultural diversity, it arises from the shortage of perspectives from tradition-
ally-excluded groups, because of a traditionally exclusive society.21s The
cultural insights of'White males are valuable, too.
216
It may well be true that unfair cultural discrimination is dangerous
even when it is not being used as a cover for racial discrimination. Indeed,
perhaps unfair cultural discrimination should even be strictly prohibited.
Nevertheless, when properly deployed in accordance with empirical data
showing how to reap the benefits of cultural diversity, discrimination
211. See Ramirez, supra note 24, at 137 n.45 (stating that diversity initiatives reflect a
rationalization, or in business parlance, the "invisible hand:' of a more diverse environment,
and that as diversity takes root institutions can be expected to find more sophisticated
means of ferreting out valuable cultural backgrounds) (citing STAcEY KOLE & GLENN
MACDONALD, ECONOMIcs, DEMOGRAPHY AND COMMUNICATION 3 (1999) (University of
Rochester School of Business working paper, on file with the Michigan Journal of Race
& Law)). Kole and MacDonald focused upon the ability of gender identification to act as a
facilitator of efficient communication between customers and employees.Their study util-
ized employment data from 12 developed nations. This data evidenced sectoral
employment patterns across the 12 economies consistent with this "communication-based
theory of diversity." It appears that women are being drawn into product delivery positions
(Where communication skills have great value) rather than product production positions.
212. The test for whether a policy is race neutral is whether it applies to Whites in the
same way as African Americans. See In'd Union v.Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
213. For example, the EEOC has studied and endorsed the diversity initiatives taking
hold in Corporate America, and has highlighted the inclusiveness of diversity initiatives as
fundamental to "best practices" in embracing diversity. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPOR-
TUNITY COMMISSION, supra note 203 (diversity initiatives should include all employees,
includingWhite males, and should not cause or result in unfairness).
214. Id.
215. See supra note 198.
216. Jacqueline A. Gilbert, Berle Ann Stead & John M. Ivanrevich, Diversity Manage-
ment: A New Organizational Paradigm, 21 J. Bus. ETHics 61, 71 (1949). "Diversity
management is a voluntary organizational program designed to create greater inclusion of
all individuals" Id. at 62.
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based upon specific cultural facility is no different from discrimination
based upon any other measure of merit, which our society has long been
so deeply wedded to on a theoretical level. Like any other measure of
merit, it is individually based. Like any other measure of merit, it is de-
pendent upon the needs of a given institution. Although it may be
difficult to measure, it can be assessed similar to any other dimension of
merit; every measure of merit entails assessment risks and predictive in-
firmities. In short, cultural diversity is a value that is best pursued in a
race-neutral, merit-driven, culture-conscious manner.
III. EQUAL PROTECTION AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY
Cultural diversity can lead to important institutional benefits in a va-
riety of institutional contexts.2" These benefits result from non-
morphological and non-heritable factors, and are, therefore, distinct from
all conceptions of race." ' Benefits arise from meritorious contributions
that are offered by individuals in a race-neutral, culture-conscious man-
ner.29 The benefits are supported by powerful empirical evidence and
arise from integrated efforts to unleash the insights that cultural diversity
offers. 2" As such, valuing cultural diversity violates no theory of Equal
Protection heretofore articulated.2"' Depriving our society of these multi-
cultural benefits would serve no interest at all and could only be justified
as a last gasp forWhite supremacy.222
217. See supra notes 121-76 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 198-204 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 12.
221. Indeed, it would be difficult to construct such a theory.When diversity has value,
it is because of an individual's cultural experiences and insights. No principled basis exists
to preclude an institution's ability to value such a meritorious contribution. As previously
shown, valuing cultural diversity entails neither discrimination on the basis of race, nor
simply generalized culture discrimination. See supra Part II.
222. Fifty years after the repeal of the "White" prerequisite, forty-five years after Brown,
and thirty-five years after the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the legacy of White supremacy
under the law festers, with little effort expended to eradicate its continuing oppressive
effects. For example, corporate America has, in general, operated based upon an assump-
tion that only White males were qualified for corporate positions in general, and
particularly senior management positions. This fact of pervasive discrimination has left
corporate American in dire need of diverse perspectives. As Secretary of Labor, Robert
Reich stated in 1995, "the glass ceiling is a concept that betrays America's most cherished
principles. It is the unseen, yet unbreachable barrier that keeps minorities and women
from rising to the upper rungs of the corporate ladder, regardless of their qualifications or
achievements." FEDERAL GLAss CEILING CoMMIssIoN, GOOD FOR BusiNEss: MAKING FULL
UsE OF THE NATION's HuMAs CAPITAL (1995) (finding that "glass ceiling" exists, operating
to exclude women and minorities and that it is detrimental to business). Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 created the 21-member, bipartisan Federal Glass Ceiling Com-
mission. Pub. L. No. 102-166, S 202(b), 203(a), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). The Commission
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Although the pursuit of White supremacy is in accordance with
American history,223 it is not in accord with the best American ideals, nor
with America's future.224 Embracing cultural diversity is the only means
available for maximizing our nation's performance.22 The new genetic
learning confirms that White supremacy is an irrational value, ignorant of
the best scientific evidence, and is surely no basis for the foundation of a
modern society. 26 As previously mentioned, empirical data also demon-
strates that embracing cultural diversity does not generate racial tensions
or resentment because it is merit-driven. 27 Thus, this part of the Article
argues that there is no substantial policy basis upon which to object to
embracing cultural diversity.22 Policy weighs heavily in favor of facilitating
cultural diversity
consisted of Senators, Representatives, business leaders and other political leaders, all ap-
pointed by President Bush. The Commission concluded: "The glass ceiling is a reality in
corporate America" FEDERAL GLASS CEILING, supra. The Commission's mandate was to
study the barriers to the advancement of minorities and women within corporate hierar-
chies, to issue a report on its findings and conclusions, and to make recommendations on
ways to dismantle the glass ceiling. See also Ann M. Morrison, THE NEW LEADERS: GUIDE-
LINES ON LEADERSHiP DIERSITv IN AMERICA 34-39 (1992) (suggesting that prejudice is the
primary barrier to corporate advancement, manifesting itself in a prejudgment that some-
one "different:' such as a female, is less able to do the job).
223. See supra notes 13, 16, 152 and accompanying text.White supremacy is fading in
America, but it has not been eradicated. Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza, the noted geneticist,
highlighted the subtlety with which our society still harbors irrational racial ideas. He
noted that The Bell Curve was far too warmly received in 1994, for anyone to assume that
America is no longer infected with racist ideas of inferiority and supremacy. CAVALLI-
SFORZA, supra note 49, at 189.
224. By the year 2025, demographic experts project that the additional 65 million
members of the U.S. population will include 30 million Latinos, 12 million African
Americans and 11 million Asian American. After year 2030, all population growth will
occur in the non-White population. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, PROJECTIONS OF THE RESI-
DENT POPULATION BY RACE, HIsPANIc ORIGIN, AND NAnvrrY: MIDDLE SEIES, 1999-2100
(2000), aailable at http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/natsum-T5.html.
225. America will not be able to succeed if it fails to come to grips with the challenges
of its increasing diversity. A society that fails to allow the full participation of a significant
portion of its population is doomed. See WEST, supra note 122, at 8, 11 ("there is no escape
from our racial interdependence, yet enforced racial hierarchy dooms us as a nation to
collective paranoia and hysteria").
226. Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza has specifically noted that from a genetic point of view
greater diversity within a population is likely to be a source of strength. CAvALLI-SFORZA,
supra note 49, at 13 (stating that any effort at artificial racial purity would be "undesirable"
and would have "very dangerous" biological consequences). From an economic point of
view, commentators have recognized that America's diversity positions it to become an
economic powerhouse. See FERNANDEZ, supra note 14, at 13-14.
227. Supra note 155.
228. The Supreme Court has previously recognized the importance of facilitating the
success of the United States in forging a multicultural society. Edmonson v. Leesville Con-
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In the past, the Court has recognized that a given institutional mis-
sion may render cultural familiarity or facility a meritorious contribution
and specifically held that pursuit of such a value was not a "racial" prefer-
ence.22 9 Certainly it is the case that due to America's tradition of
exclusion, minorities typically offer cultural skills that institutions may
find in short supply relative to those of upper middle-class White males;
still, the Court has never held that a legitimate measure of merit should
be suspect merely because it has some level of correlation to racial
groups. 23  Instead, the Court has recognized that a facially-neutral
explanation "means an explanation based upon something other than ...
race. 2 1' A factor will be deemed facially neutral even though it may "bear
a close relation" to racial factors. 232 Finally, the Court has never stated that
mere racial consciousness is constitutionally suspect; instead, the Court
seems to be reaching a consensus that race must be a "predominant fac-
tor" in a given decision. 233 At the very least, the Court has recognized that
when "race-consciousness" is inherent in a given context, it cannot be
allowed to freeze government action.234 At no time has the Court held
that admissions decisions for higher education must not be race-
conscious; to do so would be to abolish face to face interviews, require
censorship of personal essays, and eliminate careful interviews with
crete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630-31 (1991) ("If our society is to continue to progress as a
multi-racial democracy, it must recognize that ... invocation of race stereotypes retards that
progress.").
229. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 (1974) (holding that preference for Indians
did not constitute "racial" discrimination because preference only applied to federally
recognized tribes not those who are merely racially "Indian," and the preference was a
rational employment criterion because the agency imposing the preference governed
Indian tribes). Because Morton involved the Bureau of Indian Affairs, some scholars have
questioned its applicability in other contexts. ANTiEAu & RICH, supra note 33, at § 27.30.
However, the Court itself spoke in broad terms stating that the preference "reasonably and
directly related to a legitimate non-racially based goal.This is the principal characteristic of
discrimination." 417 U.S. at 554.
230. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 551-52 (1999) (holding that district may be
drawn to obtain certain party preference without being deemed racially motivated even
when the "evidence also shows a high correlation between race and party preference");
Hernandez v. NewYork, 500 U.S. 352,375 (1991) (O'ConnorJ. concurring) ("No matter
how closely tied or significantly correlated to race an explanation for [an action] may be,
the [action] does not implicate the Equal Protection Clause unless it is based on race.").
231. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360. See also supra note 212.
232. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360.
233. See Miller v.Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,916 (1995). See also Univ. and Cmty. Coll. Sys.
of Nev. v. Farmer, 930 P.2d 730, 735 (Nev. 1997) (reviewing Supreme Court decisions
regarding affirmative action and concluding that race-conscious decisions based upon
multiple non-racial factors do not run afoul of constitutional proscriptions).
234. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646 (1993) ("redistricting differs from other kinds of
state decisionmaking in that the legislature always is aware of race when it draws district
lines .... [T]hat sort of race consciousness does not inevitably lead to impermissible race
discrimination").
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references. In education, as in hiring, no monochromatic curtain can be
erected to assure an absence of race-consciousness.
235
All of this suggests strongly that the court would not reject true cul-
ture-conscious decisions, in accordance with the standards articulated in
this Article for embracing cultural diversity. Race, properly defined is no
more than an archaic pseudo-scientific concept, historically utilized as a
means of asserting White supremacy and as a moralization for racial op-
pression. 236 But racial identification, as opposed to race, defined as a series
of categories based upon yesteryear's pseudo-science, can lead to powerful
cultural experiences and insights in our racialized society.237 The use of an
individual's racial identification to serve as a marker of potential cultural
facility, is thus a rationalized use of an individual's own definition of their
cultural experience. 238 An institution seeking specific cultural facility
should be expected to look beyond a given racial identification; but given
the value of cultural diversity, and the power of diverse racial experiences
in our racialized society, prohibiting the use of race as a marker is destruc-
tive of the very cultural diversity that has been shown to be so valuable.239
In short, the use of racial identification as a marker for culture-conscious
decisions, if based upon bona fide institutional need for diversity, should
not be constitutionally prohibited. In the activities discussed herein, hiring
and college admissions, race-consciousness is unavoidable; moreover, cul-
ture and race are so intertwined that in order to unlock the full value of
culture, race-consciousness is inherent to the exercise of valuing cultural
diversity.2"
On the other hand, this Article has gone to great lengths to establish
that cultural diversity values the possession of insights and other mental
capabilities and processes and not morphology or "racial DNA" or ances-
try.24 ' It would be irrational to make decisions on the basis of "race"
instead of on the basis of the ability to contribute cultural diversity in an
institutionally meaningful way.242 Using "race" as a marker is rational in a
235. Ramirez, supra note 24, at 176.
236. See supra note 34.
237. See supra note 72-77 and accompanying text.
238. Ramirez, supra note 24, at 171.
239. See supra Part II.
240. See Haney Lopez, supra note 72, at 38-39.To require "color blindness" institutions
would be required to forgo interviews; forbid candidates from alluding to race or cultural
background (which could give clues about race); refrain from inquiry regarding parental or
familial background or alumni status (very often tantamount to race-consciousness) or
speaking with references (who could identify racial characteristics). "Race" is too embed-
ded, too patent and too manifest.
241. See supra Part II.
242. See supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
A General Theory of Cultural Diversity
highly racialized society; using it as a sole factor is a race-based, not a cul-
ture-based decision.243 Making race-based decisions under the cover of
cultural diversity is still fundamentally using race as a proxy for culture.
The Supreme Court will not allow such a practice, absent a compelling
state interest. 2" Thus, valuing cultural diversity means looking past race to
determine an individual's potential contribution to cultural diversity.2 5 As
previously highlighted, this means that some bona fide investigation be-
yond race must be conducted.
246
So conceived, valuing cultural diversity also does not run afoul of the
Supreme Court's emphasis on the personal and individual nature of Equal
Protection rights.2 4' As Justice Powell highlighted in Bakke, an individual's
contribution to cultural diversity can be assessed just as any other measure
of merit-on an individualized basis. 248 It may be that the value of a given
individual's diversity contribution is variable based upon the needs of the
institution and the supply of different kinds of diversity available to the
institution, but this is the case with all measures of merit. 245 Similarly, there
may be infirmities in the process of assessing the value of an individual's
contribution to meritorious diversity; again, however, no measure of merit
is free of predictive imperfections."' In short, cultural diversity is no dif-
ferent from any other meritorious value. Thus, valuing cultural diversity is
merit-driven in that each individual's contribution is assessed independ-
ently of their "race."
243. See supra Part II.
244. Rice v. Cayatano, 528 U.S. 495,513 (2000) (rejecting ancestry as a proxy for race).
245. See supra note 211 (embracing cultural diversity has always been about rationaliz-
ing responses to increasingly diverse environments; economists have actually shown this
process to be manifest in employment statistics.).
246. See supra note 23.
247. E.g., Univ. of Cal. Bd. of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978) (stating that
individuals are entitled to protection from racial classifications based upon race because
such distinctions impinge upon personal rights, in favor of group rights).
248. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317-18.
249. As Justice Powell stated:
In short, an admissions program operated in this way is flexible enough to
consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular quali-
fications of each applicant, and to place them on the same footing for
consideration, although not necessarily according them the same weight.
Indeed, the weight attributed to a particular'quality may vary from year to
year depending upon the "mix" both of the student body and the appli-
cants for the incoming class.
Id.
250. For example, standardized tests only predict, by design, academic performance.
They do not necessarily predict success in post-graduate activities. Alan Wolf, Has There
Been a Cognitive Revolution in America?, in THE BELL CURVE WARS 117 (Steven Fraser ed.,
1995) ("When all is said and done, IQ predicts neither later success in life nor job per-
formance.").
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The constitution does not prohibit discrimination based upon
merit."5 ' Indeed, the Supreme Court has never stricken down a measure
of merit that acts to legitimately (i.e., in a non-racial fashion) further an
institutional mission." 2 Rather, the Supreme Court has acted aggressively
to preserve the semblance of a "meritocracy.1 3 This emphasis on "indi-
vidual merit" would be for naught if the Court would reject the value of
cultural diversity, for it would then be clear that insights and experiences
would be embraced and valued only in accordance with the color of the
individual who possesses such insights and not in accordance with their
institutional value." 4 Nor is the Court free to substitute its judgment of
251. E.g., Rice v. Cayatano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) ("One of the principal reasons
race is treated as a forbidden classification is that it demeans the dignity and worth of a
person to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her own merit and essential quali-
ties."); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221-22 (1982) ("one of the goals of the Equal
Protection Clause [is] the abolition of governmental barriers presenting unreasonable
obstacles to advancement on the basis of individual merit").
252. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (striking down racial
classification that was non-merit driven); Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989) (same). Of course, indulging invidious racial discrimination could never be a meri-
torious value. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974) (stating that goals must be
"legitimate non-racially based" goals). Also, any measure of merit adopted with the intent
to discriminate is violative of the Equal Protection Clause. See United States v. Fordice,
505 U.S. 717, 737-38 (1992) (holding that ACT scores, originally adopted with discrimi-
natory intent and having segregative effects, cannot be used as sole admission requirement
to university.).
253. E.g., United States v.Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 517 (1996) (prohibiting state action
categorically excluding women, in "disregard of their individual merit:' from educational
opportunity).
254. As Justices Scalia and Thomas have recognized:
This interpretation comports with dictionary definitions of the term dis-
crimination, which means to "distinguish," to "differentiate:' or to make a
"distinction in favor of or against, a person or thing based on the group,
class, or category to which that person or thing belongs rather than on
individual merit:' Random House Dictionary 564 (2nd ed. 1987); see also
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 648 (1981) (defining "dis-
crimination" as "the making or perceiving of a distinction or difference"
or as "the act, practice, or an instance of discriminating categorically
rather than individually").
Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 616 (1999) (Scalia,Thomas,JJ., dissenting).
Thus, at the very least, all indicia of merit should be treated the same.Valuing merit held
by traditionally-excluded groups differently than that held by traditionally favored groups
amounts to discrimination. Some commentators have already argued that the Supreme
Court is naturally inclined to protecting White privilege. See Martha R. Mahoney, White-
ness and Remedy: Under-Ruling Civil Rights in Walker v. City of Mesquite, 85 CORNELL L.
REv. 1309, 1341, 1352-56 (2000) ("[W]hites virtually never lose on the merits when chal-
lenging civil rights gains by minorities").
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the institutional value of cultural diversity; institutional values must be
determined in the first instance by the institution."' 5 Under this approach
to valuing cultural diversity, and given the empirical case in favor of diver-
sity, it is difficult to see how the Court could ever find valuing cultural
diversity to be "motivated by race."' 6
Still, merely showing that cultural diversity can be valued in a way
that is squarely within Equal Protection doctrine is a start rather than an
end. Both valuing cultural diversity and the "new genetics" challenge
Equal Protection doctrine. A "revolution" has occurred in scientific
thought on race and diversity; law must keep pace.2 7 As it stands today,
Equal Protection treats race as "immutable" and something an individual
is "born" with, as opposed to recognizing the inherent instability of race,
and that there really is only one race." 8 Similarly, the courts have thus far
failed to recognize that cultural diversity is a meritorious value that ex-
ploits a non-morphological, non-heritable, dimension of an individual's
racial experience, and is a key element to fulfilling America's promise and
multicultural destiny.2 9 The primary barrier to exploiting our cultural
diversity to the maximum benefit of our society is the hangover ofWhite
supremacy, as ensconced in law by, among others, the Supreme Court. The
implications of these defects are important.
With respect to the first problem, the Supreme Court has stumbled
upon the right approach through no fault of its own. "Racial" classifica-
tions are almost always irrational, as shown by the new genetic learning,
and should rightly be subject to the strictest scrutiny."6 An adjustment is
needed, however, in the language deployed to reach this result.The Court
should redefine "race" (which is a rather fundamental concept in the law
255. Derek Bok, former Harvard President, elaborated:
It is dangerous for judges or for voters to overrule considered educational
policies, especially those agreed to by virtually every college and university
that has the opportunity to pick and choose among its applicants. In the
end, we will have better universities if we leave educational questions to
educators.
Transcript of the Boston Bar Association Diversity Committee Conference: Recruiting, Hiring and Re-
taining Lawyers of Color, BOSTON BAR JouiNLq, May/June 2000, at 8, 19 (statement of former
Harvard President Derek Bok). See also Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,262 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (because a free society depends upon free universities the "exclu-
sion of the governmental intervention in the intellectual life of a university" must be
secured).
256. Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999).
257. See supra note 35.
258. Supra notes 87-113 and accompanying text.
259. No court has addressed, squarely, whether culture-conscious decision making can be
undertaken without violating proscriptions against race discrimination. Indeed, no reported
case even mentions the issue. Instead, all seem to deal only with race-based decision-making.
This dynamic is also mirrored in legal scholarship. See supra note 4.
260. See supra note 45.
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of Equal Protection) in a manner that reflects scientific teaching. Thus,
race only has meaning as a historical relic turning upon traditional classi-
fications of humanity based upon certain morphological features and
other heritable traits.26 ' The Court should frankly acknowledge the ab-
surdity of thinking in racial terms and start an important process of
national re-education by highlighting its own missteps in this area, which
is vital to the well-being of our society.262 Fundamentally, strict scrutiny
should continue to apply to racial classifications, but the Court should
clarify that this degree of scrutiny is reserved for classifications that turn
upon the backwards thinking of the 19th and 20th Century pseudo-
scientists regarding the significance and cataloging of racial groups based
upon heritable morphological features.21 In sum, the Court should refuse
to participate in the further racialization of any group and strike down
any laws targeting groups that have previously been racialized, at least as a
general proposition.
264
This approach does not preclude all racial classifications. Strict
scrutiny has been a controversial concept, but the Court has never
treated strict scrutiny as always fatal.2 ' Examples abound in which it is
entirely illogical to ignore race even though race itself is entirely illogi-
cal.2 66 The common theme to these cases, in general, is that a race-based
classification rationally furthers important state missions in a non-
invidious manner.2 7 This approach is also fundamentally agnostic regard-
ing race-based affirmative action. Affirmative action would instead turn
on whether judges view unwinding or dismantling White supremacy as
a "compelling" state interest. Given the traditional ideals and rhetoric of
our republic, and the heinous history of racism in America and under
law, it is difficult to comprehend that such an interest is not
261. See supra note 34.
262. From the Supreme Court, on down, our society lives the myth of race, upon a shaky
foundation of discredited pseudo-science. See supra notes 79-121 and accompanying text.
263. I recognize that "race" has always been a mess, and plugging strict scrutiny into the
non-sensical racial categories of yesteryear may seem to be an impossible task. Over the years,
however, the Court has actually delineated many of the racial categories in need of protec-
tion. Indeed, from Ozawa to Rice the Supreme Court fiom has been the leading player in
racializing our society. See supra notes 88-121. The point is that the Court should refuse to
participate further in racialization.
264. See, e.g., Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541,546 (1999).
265. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944) (upholding internment of
citizens without evidence of disloyalty based upon Japanese ancestry during World War II).
See supra note 210.
266. See supra note 210.
267. See supra note 211.
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compelling.2 6 The "new genetics" now means that any assumption of in-
feriority must be rejected, and all racial inequalities should be
presumptively deemed to be caused by the vestiges of state sponsored
White supremacy.169 Three decades after the death throes of White su-
premacy de jure, "affirmative action" is needed."" Cultural diversity is our
destiny, and without elimination of vestigial White supremacy, getting
there will be more painful, more tortuous, and, possibly, more bloody."1
A further adjustment would entail increased scrutiny of supposed
non-race-based classifications that have a patent and embedded racial
bias. 212 Currently, the Court will apply strict scrutiny to state action un-
dertaken with a racially discriminatory intent, meaning that it is
unexplainable on grounds other than race. 73 This can be a very high stan-
dard. 74 Under this formula, for facially neutral acts, just about any
explanation will do in terms of serving as a cover for racism.7 ' If valuing
cultural diversity means anything, it means tearing down artificial barriers
to success. 76 If the "new genetics" teaches that specific morphological and
heritable features have virtually no general genetic significance, then ac-
tors cannot justify utilizing measures of ability that have a wide disparity
268. The battle lines on this issue are by now well-drawn within the legal academy. See
supra note 5.
269. See supra note 45.
270. "Affirmative Action" is a term without clear meaning. Ramirez, supra note 24, at
142 n.72.
271. See supra note 15.
272. See supra note 76.
273. Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 546 (1999).
274. See Hernandez v. City of NewYork, 500 U.S. 352,360 (1991) (stating that plaintiff
must show decision was" 'because of' not merely 'in spite of' "race.).
275. E.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Dev. Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265
(1977) (proof of a racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause);Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (finding rational
basis for standardized verbal test used to screen for police officer jobs in the District of
Columbia). It appears that at the very least the officials involved in Washington would have
faced a heavier burden in order to justify the use of the test under a recklessness standard.
See also McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,298 (1987) (stating that defendant challenging a
state's death penalty would have to show that it was enacted "because of an anticipated
racially discriminatory effect").
276. In Washington the Supreme Court evinced serious discomfort with any rule that a
14th Amendment violation could be found based upon disparate impact alone:
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid,
absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens one
race more than another would be far reaching and would raise serious
questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare,
public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burden-
some to the poor and to the average [B]lack than to the more affluent
[White].
Washington, 426 U.S. at 248.
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between traditionally-defined racial groups. So far, the courts seem to in-
dulge measures of merit that have embedded racial bias, while not
allowing institutions to compensate for embedded racism. 277 One glaring
example involves the University of Texas Law School.278 Despite a tradi-
tion seething with overt racism, the Fifth Circuit explicitly approved
legacy status as a basis for preference, while prohibiting any use of race.
279
Thus, relatives of alumni from times when only Whites could attend enjoy
a preference over equally-qualified African Americans. Such a ruling can
only be emblematic ofjudicial comfort with reinforcing embedded White
supremacy. Another example is continued use of standardized tests, like
the SAT and LSAT and other psychometrician efforts to rank human tal-
ent.28 0 We know that these tests have an embedded racial bias in that they
transmit racial oppression, yet they are warmly received by schools. 21 ' To
address instances such as these, the Court should now condemn reckless
racial discrimination, at the very least.282 Under such a formulation, it
would be tantamount to intentional discrimination to knowingly use
measures of merit with unjustified racial biases. If we are to unleash the
277. "Current doctrine benefits the government decision maker who remains-either
through ignorance or design--ostensibly indifferent to decisions that have a disparate ra-
cial impact. It straight jackets those who value diversity and consciously seek to overcome
the effects of past discrimination." ATirr u & RICH, supra note 33, at § 27.01.This Article
seeks to reverse this paradigm: the court should straightjacket those indifferent to decisions
that have a disparate impact, and benefit those who value cultural diversity.
278. Hopwood v.Texas, 78 E3d 932,946 (5th Cir. 1995).
279. Id.
280. Even today, it is arguable that the unbridled use of these tests and legacy status
perpetuate embedded racism, and their continued use amounts to knowing discrimination,
if "intent" were defined broadly to encompass recklessness. In other Fourteenth Amend-
ment contexts, the courts have held that deliberate or callous indifference evidenced by an
actual intent to violate a plaintiff's rights or "reckless disregard" of rights is actionable un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment. E.g., Wilson v.Williams, 83 F3d 870, 875-76 (7th Cir.
1996) (addressing constitutional tort claim). Recklessness in this context would mean
"proceeding with knowledge that the harm is substantially certain to occur." W PAGE
KEErON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 34 (5th ed. 1984). Thus, an actor proceeding in a
course of conduct with knowledge of an unjustified disparate impact would violate the
Equal Protection Clause.
281. See supra notes 76, 148.
282. In practice, this approach would not condemn all conduct found illegal under the
disparate impact analysis of discriminatory conduct under Tide VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Liability will not be imposed
under Griggs if a defendant demonstrates that challenged practice is "job related" and
"consistent with business necessity". 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(K)(1)(A) (1994). Under a reck-
lessness approach, the plaintiff would have the burden of showing that the defendant had
no reasonable basis for the practice, standard, or rule that had a racially disparate impact,
and, for example, proceeded upon such a course with knowledge of the unjustified dispa-
rate impact.
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full benefits of our cultural diversity, such discrimination must be
stemmed.
Finally, the Court needs to revisit cultural discrimination. In Rice, the
Court came close to recognizing that discrimination against cultural
groups is prohibited but, instead, invoked the time-worn process of racial
fabrication."3 But if the "new genetics" teaches that there are no geneti-
cally significant group distinctions, then there is no basis for requiring any
such heritable bond for protection. Group oppression is the gist of Equal
Protection, with or without a putative genetic bond.21 4 The obsession with
heritable traits is emblematic of fundamentally racist thinking.28 When
cultural groups are faced with discrimination based solely on attributes of
cultural group membership, as opposed to the possession of valuable cul-
tural insights or facility, the Court should extend the highest degree of
Equal Protection. This will preclude discrimination based upon cultural
elements or attributes (like language) without impairing our nation's abil-
ity to harness cultural skills. If we are to truly facilitate exploitation of our
multicultural strengths, then cultural oppression and discrimination must
be eliminated.8 6
CONCLUSION:
A MODEL OF CULTURAL DISCRIMINATION
This Article has attempted to resolve the challenges posed to Equal
Protection doctrine by the "new cultural diversity," including the "new
genetics." Each of these developments requires that the Supreme Court
revise its fundamental approach to race. The "new genetics" teaches that
since there are no genetically-defined racial groups, there is no immutable
racial identity The "new cultural diversity" shows that non-morphological
and non-ancestral benefits, in the form of cultural understanding and in-
sights, can be achieved by embracing cultural diversity, and that these
benefits can be achieved in a facially-neutral, merit-driven, and culture-
conscious manner. These benefits do not arise from ancestry, genetics, or
the morphological features that are traditionally associated with race. They
283. See supra notes 102-21 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 32.
285. See supra notes 59-71 and accompanying text.
286. It is unclear if Hernandez would survive this standard. Hernandez v. NewYork, 500
U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (finding that exclusion of Spanish speaking jurors in criminal case
against Latino was "race neutral"). The prosecutor in Hernandez claimed to be motivated
by fear that Spanish-speaking jurors would adhere to official translation. Id. at 361. If dis-
crimination based upon cultural attributes is more strictly scrutinized, then it would seem
that the dissent's suggestion that more narrowly-tailored means were available to stem any
risk that the Spanish-speaking jurors may not defer entirely to the official translation. Id. at
375-79 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
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arise from a kind of learned knowledge that should be treated as any
other measure of merit.
The Article has attempted to articulate a model of cultural diversity
that reconciles Equal Protection doctrine with the "new cultural diver-
sity" and the "new genetics." Essentially, this Article advocates a
conservative retooling of Equal Protection so that discrimination based
upon cultural facility or specific cultural expertise is widely permitted
while generalized cultural discrimination is treated as tantamount to racial
discrimination. Moreover, this Article advocates that the Supreme Court
explicitly recognize the archaic nature of race and reject its own approach
which is based upon the idea of racial immutability. The upshot of this
approach is to maximize protection against irrational racial discrimination
while permitting full exploitation of America's multicultural assets and
ideals. At the same time, this Article urges that the Court begin to move
beyond race and address the vestiges of state-sponsored racial oppression
in a more aggressive fashion that reflects both the recognition that our
society must embrace cultural diversity and that there is no genetic basis
to the rampant inequalities within our society.
[VOL. 7:33
